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20 September 1984

# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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## USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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ARMED FORCES

DESIGN INSTITUTES' OUTPUT FAULTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jun 84 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col B. Lyapkalo: "Military Planners' Conference"]

[Text] In addition to providing military construction sites with quality documentation, USSR Ministry of Defense planning organizations also accomplish the tasks of further improving the organization of planning estimate work.

Much has been done during the past three years of the five-year plan: labor productivity rose eight percent in planning organizations, the quality of plans improved and there was an increase in the level of technical and economic decisions which permitted a substantial decrease in the cost of construction work and a reduction in its labor-intensiveness. But far from all reserves have been used for improving the technology of planning, unifying and standardizing planning decisions.

A military planners' conference was held recently which discussed and adopted recommendations for a further strengthening of the working efficiency of planning and surveying organizations and for improving the quality of planning estimates which are produced.

Lt Gen G. Domanin and Lt Gen B. Petrov gave briefings at the conference.

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## ARMED FORCES

### CASE OF MISASSIGNED SERVICEMAN EXAMINED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jun 84 p 2

[Article by Lt Col B. Karpov, permanent KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent for the Baltic Military District: "With a Correspondent's Commentary: ...But We're Talking About an Officer's Career"]

[Text] Lt I. Kalyagin, who is serving in one of the air units of the Baltic Military District, turned to the editors. He wrote that he has served almost four years in the Army, and outside his specialty for all this time. Hence all the troubles. The command element is dissatisfied with his service. His promotion to the next military rank has been held up for more than a year now. Once he was even removed from the table of authorization, which created financial hardships for the family. Repeated requests for a transfer to a position according to the specialty obtained in military school remain unsatisfied.

Lt Col B. Karpov, our permanent correspondent for the Baltic Military District, comments on the young officer's letter after checking out everything reported in it.

I will say right away that I. Kalyagin recently was transferred to another unit. It is true that again it is not according to his profile, but he is satisfied with service and people there also are satisfied with his service. Of course, the problem remains for him.

It appears that it will be useful to have a look at why it arose at all.

Let's turn back to 1980. A graduate of the Kaliningrad Military Aviation Technical School, Kalyagin traveled with a light heart to his first duty station. Unexpected difficulties and annoyances began even before he had reached it. He was told in the Carpathian Military District Aviation Headquarters: "You'll work in another specialty."

That is how the "absence" from the job for which the person had studied more than a single year took place. Kalyagin became the commander of a telegraph platoon.

There followed a transfer to the Turkestan Military District, and again to the position of telegraph platoon commander. Here people already were operating from inertia: from such a position to the very same... Seemingly logical. A temporary specialty became a permanent one.

He found no understanding or help. Don't those senior comrades really deserve a rebuke here who, like former company commander Capt Yu. Redin merely stated that "Lt Kalyagin has poor professional training" or, like Capt A. Sysoyev, who wasted efforts not to help a comrade, but to "expose a pseudospecialist."

What a paradox: a person is appointed outside his specialty and he is reproached in addition for allegedly not knowing his job. Meanwhile Kalyagin besieged the command element with applications and requested that he be used where he was intended to be used.

Then came a new transfer, this time to the Baltic Military District and, like a gleam of hope, the promise that finally he would be appointed in his specialty. But until his personal file arrived the district aviation headquarters decided to make him temporarily the very same telegraph platoon commander in a signal battalion.

"Take command; you don't have to accept the equipment. It's all the same, for you soon will be taken from us," said Lt Col A. Martyuchenko, who was the battalion commander at that time.

The matter of a transfer in the specialty also dragged out this time-- Kalyagin's documents had not yet arrived from the Turkestan Military District personnel entities. For some reason the documents weren't sent out for a long time. The battalion already had lost patience and telephone calls flew to the aviation headquarters: Just when will you transfer him? When will you send an officer of this profile for the position of telegraph platoon commander?

They sent the officer and Kalyagin ended up outside the table of allowances. When Kalyagin's personal file finally came it turned out that the lieutenant already had "no moral right" to request a transfer. Just what did the personnel workers see in the officer's documents to arrive at such a stern conclusion?

First of all, it was his poor technical competency (but we will repeat that this was connected with his work outside the specialty). Secondly, the personal file contained an entry about Kalyagin's insufficiently high moral qualities. On what basis was the conclusion drawn about substantial flaws in moral make-up?

Essentially it was because of one incident. Here is how a strange entry made by Sysoyev on the back side of a Komsomol performance appraisal issued back in school tells about it: "Lt Kalyagin exceeded his rights and conferred on himself the military rank of senior lieutenant, for which he was punished" (seal and signature: Sysoyev).

There was such an episode in Kalyagin's life. Just before the very end of his stay in the Turkestan Military District an application was submitted for promoting him to the next military rank. Warmed by his comrades' congratulations and by words to the effect that it was time to drill one more hole in the shoulderboards, Lt Kalyagin made up shoulderboards with three stars without waiting for the application to be approved or the extract from the order to arrive in the unit. But for incomprehensible reasons, the application was delayed or lost somewhere. By the way, that fate did not just befall him. By that time a conflict had arisen between Kalyagin and Sysoyev and the latter hinted to him that he would get even with Kalyagin...

Strictly speaking, that is the entire story. It was initially a simple one, beginning with the fact that the person was assigned to a position outside his specialty, but in time the story grew substantially complicated and had a negative effect on the officer's career. Unfortunately no one who worked on the "Kalyagin matter" seriously thought about this. They should have, for we're talking about an officer's career.

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## ARMED FORCES

### REGIONAL PAPER HIT FOR WEAK RESPONSE TO KOMSOMOL CONFERENCE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jun 84 p 2

[Press review: "The Komsomol Theme"]

[Text] The All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries which took place in Moscow, our Motherland's capital, for three days from 28 through 30 May was an event of great importance in the life of the Army and Navy Komsomol and of all Soviet youth. Soldiers in the Komsomol took to heart the theses and conclusions contained in the speech at this conference by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Comrade K. U. Chernenko as well as in briefings by USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov and Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy Army Gen A. A. Yepishev.

It is a very important task of the military press to show the progress in practical implementation of conference recommendations in a detailed and interesting manner. Just how is the task being accomplished and what is indicated by an analysis of district, group and fleet newspapers for the period of time since the conference? Attention should be given above all to the businesslike, mobilizing tone of statements. For example, there were many interesting articles and selections under the rubric "Implement Recommendations of the All-Army Komsomol Conference!" printed in the pages of SLAVA RODINY, newspaper of the Red Banner Carpathian Military District. It told about summer training successes of Komsomol members in the outstanding surface-to-air missile battalion commanded by Lt Col P. Red'kin and about how they are performing operational readiness duty to protect our Motherland's air borders.

The battalion has won the challenge prize for precise, vigilant operational readiness duty for several years in a row. A large proportion of the work here was by the Komsomol members. They are struggling persistently to fulfill socialist competition pledges, they are mastering related specialties and they are bettering the combat work norms. The newspaper reports that in summing up results of a recent period of duty the commander noted with satisfaction that the personnel remained true to their word this time as well. The outstanding grade they received was the missilemen's worthy, businesslike response to the high award conferred on the Army Komsomol.



"Experience is Not a Personal Matter" was the title of an article in the newspaper by WO [Praporshchik] V. Didenko, which raises the issue that the experience of Komsomol members who are rated specialists and masters of fire and of combat vehicle driving must be adopted persistently. This was the subject of talk at the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries. The newspaper acted correctly by publishing SrSgt M. Grinevich's article entitled "Don't Forget the 'Average People'."

Based on recommendations developed by the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries, SLAVA RODINY also printed the lead articles "Always be on Guard!", "Loving the Army Means Serving the Motherland Honorably," "A Komsomol Member's Place is in Front!" and "By the Laws of Troop Comradeship" and a talk with young soldiers by Great Patriotic War participant Col (Ret) K. Titakov entitled "Honor and Integrity." These are persuasive articles designed for the young reader.

What has been said, however, does not mean that everything conforms to today's demands in the work by editors of the newspaper SLAVA RODINY in the propaganda, study and implementation of recommendations by the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries. There are deficiencies and, unfortunately, they are also typical of other newspapers.

One of them is the publication of articles which are insufficiently deep in content and are only formally "tied" to the conference with a banner headline, title, or simply a mention of the Komsomol forum which took place. But the articles sometimes do not contain specific experience or reflections on implementing the recommendations adopted at the conference.

As told in SLAVA RODINY, the people in Lvov had a warm greeting for Carpathian military personnel who took part in the work of the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries. There were both speeches and flowers, but then what happened to the conferees? In any case their articles did not appear in the district newspaper's pages in the first half of June. Isn't that a lot of time to get moving? The journalists unfortunately displayed no organizing abilities here, but it is clear that the experience gained by the Carpathian personnel in intercourse at the conference must become the property of all Komsomol organizations. The newspaper is called upon to play an important role here.

The article by WO Didenko devoted to foremost experience was mentioned earlier. In addition, one of the articles printed by the newspaper emphasized that "the example . . . of people selflessly performing duty to the Motherland is worthy of emulation. Like the experience of foremost military collectives, their experience merits deep study, generalization and dissemination." But now very few articles are appearing in the newspaper by the immediate creators of experience, including the experience of Komsomol work, and above all from among privates and NCO's. The editorial staff workers who have the official duty of helping masters of combat specialties and Komsomol activists to generalize experience did not have their influential say here.



The conference pointed out the need to improve work forms and methods and the work style of the Komsomol, but there were no interesting articles which appeared in SLAVA RODINY over a month's time on the themes of intra-Komsomol work, party leadership of the Komsomol, or the work of party and Komsomol organizations in the ideological-political and moral indoctrination of the youth. It is only on an informational plane that the newspaper tells about the Komsomol organizations' work to strengthen sponsorship ties with Komsomol members of plants, factories, kolkhozes and sovkhoses and with DOSAAF organizations, and about helping schools and vocational-technical schools to improve the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth.

Great opportunities now are opening up for the productive work of Komsomol organizations to propagandize combat traditions during days of preparation for the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War. Many other themes suggested to newspapers by conference materials also await their resolution.

It is especially important to develop in Armed Forces personnel a feeling of love for the Motherland, hatred for her enemies and a constant readiness for an exploit.

There are important tasks for the Army and Navy Komsomol and for all newspapers stemming from the examination at the latest session of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo of the question of further improvement of party leadership of the Komsomol and an improvement in the Komsomol's role in communist indoctrination of the youth.

On 12 July the Leninist Komsomol will celebrate an important event in its life--the 60th anniversary of the conferring of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's name on the Komsomol. It is the task of military newspapers to relate more fully and clearly how Komsomol soldiers and all young people are preparing for the banner date and how they are fulfilling Lenin's historic behest to the youth to learn communism given in his speech at the 3d Komsomol Congress.

The newspaper SLAVA RODINY titled one of its first articles following the All-Army Conference as follows: "Much Work Lies Ahead." This is true, but it is also true that the work must be accompanied by the journalists' vigorous, creative search and that it must contribute to a further strengthening of the Komsomol organizations' role in assuring that the example is set by Komsomol members in training and discipline and in developing in the homeland's young defenders a political and military vigilance, firm ideological conditioning, and readiness to execute the Motherland's combat order at any moment.

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## ARMED FORCES

### CAREER OF COL GEN POPOV REVIEWED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jun 84 p 3

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Ye. Sorokin: "Important Career People: A Builder's Exploit"]

[Text] Col Gen (Ret) N. Popov impatiently awaits every meeting with the soldiers. This is not only because he sees his present duty and his share of concerns in having the memory of the heroic past pass indelibly from generation to generation. "These meetings also provide me personally with a great deal," says the veteran. "It is as if one becomes years younger. Most important, you see again and again that the job begun by our generation continues worthily. It follows that the years have not been lived in vain."

The count of years lived by Popov has crossed the 80-year mark.

Nikolay Mikhaylovich Popov began his working life as a construction worker. From 1920 through 1928 he was a work superintendent at a construction site in Kislovodsk. In 1926 he completed the construction department of the Terskiy Industrial Tekhnikum by correspondence, and five years later he completed the industrial construction faculty of the Moscow Higher Construction Engineering School. Later he worked for two years as a senior engineer of the Promstroyproyekt [Industrial Construction Project] in Moscow. But he was irrepressibly drawn by the grandiose construction sites and by the romance of creation. Popov repeatedly wrote applications requesting that he be sent where the giants of the first five-year plans were being born, but the chief of Promstroyproyekt invariably responded: "We ourselves need intelligent specialists."

"Then I used cunning," smiles Popov. "When I received a notice from the military commissariat I didn't tell my superiors anything because, first of all, they still would have 'reserved' me and, secondly, the military commissariat learned that I soon was to travel to the East."

In that autumn of 1933 the Special Military Construction Corps was activated from units of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts, consisting of 15 separate construction battalions (1,000 persons in each) brought together into three brigades. Nikolay Mikhaylovich was assigned to the position of construction unit chief of the 35th Battalion, 2d Brigade. The battalion commander greeted his deputy with joy.

"We have more than enough work to do!" he said in a businesslike manner.  
"Begin immediate preparations for a move. It's a long trip, to Khabarovsk."

He purchased the necessary tools, boarded the train, spent many days on the road and then--Hello, Far East! They had to begin on a bare place. The battalion was accommodated in unfinished barracks. Popov managed to persuade the construction heads that first they had to get properly settled and only then begin building the production facilities. A severe far-eastern winter lay ahead.

"Our commissar, Petr Grigor'yevich Podmoskovnyy, and I fell to thinking how to accustom the people to what was for them an unusual climate and to the difficult working conditions," says Col Gen (Ret) N. Popov. "We decided that the important thing for us officers was a personal example and so after getting up in any weather, even in a minus 30 degree temperature, we would perform physical exercise, run and sponge down with icy water with everyone else. By the way, we also were supported here by the brigade command element. Brigade commander Yan Semenovich Adamson, a hero of Kakhovka and a red-banner man, as they said at that time, was a person of surprising integrity."

The Dal'sel'mash Plant, which the battalion was helping to build, was one of the largest in the Far East. It is striking even by today's standards. There were incredible difficulties in the builders' path. There was a shortage of equipment, skilled workers and the necessary facility, but installations which were unique for those times had to be erected.

When construction was in full swing during the summer RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] Chief of Staff A. Yegorov and Deputy Narkom [People's Commissar] of Defense Ya. Gamarnik arrived. "We weren't warned that the big chiefs were coming," recalls Popov, "and frankly speaking, my appearance wasn't for guests. On seeing them I sent for the brigade commander and hurried to greet them. I reported properly. Aleksandr Il'ich Yegorov questioned me about the state of affairs. He also asked a very difficult question: Was I personally confident that we would turn over all buildings on time? I responded: 'We are all sure of this.' And then I thought, here goes, and I laid out all our troubles: the lack of materials, the poor quality of plans... They promised to help."

The 35th Battalion matured in the strenuous, persistent work. The command of the Separate Red-Banner Far East Army and the Special Military Construction Corps held a command conference in early 1935 which also heard a briefing from Military Engineer 3d Rank N. Popov. The 35th Battalion was declared best in the corps based on work results and it was sent to Komsomolsk-on-Amur to build the now famous Amurstal' Plant.

Popov was assigned to head up the group which was to prepare a facility for receiving personnel. The battalion had a double holiday on the day of the 18th anniversary of the Great October Revolution: by that date they had removed the last enlisted men's tent and all personnel were accommodated in quality barracks.

Popov's authority as an engineer was indisputable. He was respected both by superiors and subordinates for technical erudition and for the ability to find a solution to the most difficult situation. He also was respected for the desire to always look truth in the eye.

Maj Gen (Ret) G. Grishayenkov, who at that time was the corps chief engineer, wrote: "Iosif Vikent'yevich Kosior, a representative of the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] for Far East Kray, visited the construction site of the Amurstal' Plant in the summer of 1936. In briefing the situation, Popov expressed many complaints about Comrade Litvinov, director of the future plant. Kosior thanked him for his frankness and took note of the young military engineer's efficiency and the maturity of his opinions. Popov soon became deputy chief engineer of the corps."

I will cite only two figures in order to present the scope of the tasks which the corps was accomplishing. The corps had more than 20,000 persons and the annual construction program exceeded 100 million rubles.

Military Engineer 2d Rank N. Popov greeted the stormy year of 1941 in the post of chief of the Baltic Military District Billeting Department. Troops were arriving and all necessary conditions for living and for combat training had to be created for them. At times unit and subunit personnel had to be billeted, as they said in the old days. They couldn't get by here without the help of the local populace.

"At that time I had occasion to meet Arvid Yanovich Pel'she, secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee," says Popov. "For me this was an invaluable school of party principle, efficiency, and ability to mobilize people and direct their efforts toward fulfilling the primary task."

War already was on the threshold.

Its first and most difficult days are memorable to everyone. Troops of the Northwest Front withdrew to the East with bloody, stubborn fighting. Construction of command posts and the organization of hospitals and locations for units in the field now made up the range of daily concerns for Military Engineer Popov. He demanded the maximum of everyone, but above all of himself. He was inexorably merciless toward displays of passiveness and negligence, but never tried to do everything with punishments. If some special hitch occurred he would sit down at the calculations with his subordinates, look over everything and check it out. He would depart only when he was sure that things were going well. He was invariably calm and businesslike no matter how desperately difficult the situation might be at times.

In the second to last year of the war Popov suddenly was summoned to Moscow for a new assignment. He was ordered to take over the Leningrad Front construction directorate.

At that time he had occasion to meet Nikolay Alekseyevich Voznesenskiy, first deputy chairman of the USSR SNK. "You are being given a special kind of



assignment," said Voznesenskiy. "In addition to the construction of military installations, your directorate is to perform reconstruction work. There is major devastation in the city. It is a matter of political importance to restore Leningrad."

The first conversation with Leningrad Front commander Mar SU L. Govorov was brief. "It doesn't disturb you that you will have to reconstruct palaces as well?" he asked. "Not at all, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union," responded Popov. "Before the war I had occasion to do work similar to this."

The mutilated city covered with wounds was brought back to life. People worked without regard for fatigue and deprivations. "In labor as in combat!" was not simply a motto, but a necessity for each one, for the war still was going on.

Once Academician Iosif Abgarovich Orbeli, director of the State Hermitage, came to Popov. "The treasures of the Hermitage must be saved," he began heatedly. "The ceilings are about to crumble in many places. The roof has numerous holes and water is getting into the building. It's impossible to wait."

Nikolay Mikhaylovich listened to the world-famous scientist and agonizingly thought about what to answer. That the military builders had a superintensive plan? That even so the people were working to exhaustion to cope with priority assignments? But it was a question of a national sacred thing, the Hermitage!

"We'll try to help you," was all that Popov said.

In summing up construction results for 1945, Leningrad Military District Commander Mar SU L. Govorov noted in his order that the military builders had successfully overcome all difficulties and honorably coped with the plan for capital reconstruction work.

District construction directorate chief Engr-Col N. Popov was recognized with an award.

The fighting ended and the country was returning to peaceful labor. Thousands of cities and villages lay in mournful ruin. At that time the word "build" meant to restore life, but it was necessary to build on a new basis by resolutely rejecting the obsolete, outmoded methods. There are few who know that military builders played an important role in the search for new forms of construction. They were the ones who were among the first in the country to master large-panel house construction. Later, in 1955, their experience too was the basis for the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "Measures for Further Industrialization, Quality Improvement and Cost Reduction of Construction."

Nikolay Mikhaylovich Popov also was at the origin of the new method. Being a deputy chief of Glavvoenstroy [Main Military Construction Directorate] at

that time, he supported the idea of large-panel house construction. He briefed the innovation to Army Gen A. Khrulev, chief of Armed Forces Rear and deputy minister for rear of the USSR Armed Forces. Andrey Vasil'yevich Khrulev said this: "Take it up boldly, I'll support you."

Popov brought in a wide circle of engineers to accomplish the set task. Engr-Lt Col A. Makarov, at that time a worker of the Moscow military construction directorate, worked especially actively and productively among those engineers. An experimental production where panels were made was organized at one of the enterprises. Experience proved that engineering intuition and a feeling for new things did not let Nikolay Mikhaylovich Popov down this time as well.

"As a leader and engineer," says USSR State Prize Laureate, Honored Builder of the RSFSR Col (Ret) A. Makarov, "General Popov was especially distinguished by the fact that he was able to grasp not only the essence, but also the value of an idea, develop it and help implement it without pigeonholing it. He never shifted to directive language in a technical dispute; he would persuade with his enormous experience, his talent as an engineer and his ability to anticipate."

It must be assumed that these qualities played more than a minor role in Maj Gen Popov's appointment to the position of deputy (and later first deputy) chief of construction and troop billeting of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The first postwar years were in progress. Reactionaries of every stripe could not conceal their rejoicing: The Soviet Union had been weakened and thrown backward; it couldn't rise up even in a few decades. They began the "cold war" against us, blackmailing us with nuclear weapons... All this forced our country to concentrate efforts on developing powerful nuclear missile weaponry, a reliable shield for the Motherland. We made sacrifices and endured deprivations, and we denied ourselves a great deal in order to avert the mortal threat hovering over the country.

HSU Lt Gen (Ret) M. Grigorenko, Lenin Prize laureate and Honored Builder of the RSFSR, recalls: "A notice appeared in the press in the summer of 1957 which produced the effect of a bomb blast in the West: the Soviet Union had conducted successful tests of the first ballistic missile. The imperialists immediately softened the threatening tone toward our country: now it not only was reliably defended, but also could respond worthily to any intrigues of the enemies. This not only was a credit to the scientists, designers, planners and workers; it was also a credit to the military builders whose work was directed at that time by Nikolay Mikhaylovich Popov as well."

The military builders had to construct unique facilities under severe conditions far from supply bases. There was of course no experience in that kind of construction. They largely had to rely on intuition and conduct a constant search for new solutions.



"I once suggested to Nikolay Mikhaylovich Popov that we conduct an experiment," recalls Maj Gen (Ret) N. Patrikeyev, an Honored Builder of the RSFSR. "It was a question of assembling a reinforcing cage together with heavy inserts on the surface of the ground and then lowering it into the shaft using two cranes. It was a risky matter and not everyone supported me. But Popov responded: 'If everything has been confirmed by calculations begin preparations. In the future act more boldly--construction rates now are the most important thing'."

The creative daring, selfless labor and organizing talents of Honored Builder of the RSFSR party member N. Popov were recognized with the title of Hero of Socialist Labor and with many orders.

Nikolay Mikhaylovich Popov's life, rich in events and full of labor and selfless service to duty, is linked inseparably with the history of our country and its Armed Forces. Despite his substantial age, Col Gen (Ret) Popov, chairman of the veterans' council of military builders of the Moscow section of the Soviet War Veterans' Committee, even today lives with the country's concerns. "I believe the veterans always must remember the resolutions of the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum," he says, "about the need to strengthen the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth and instil in new generations a feeling of historic responsibility for the fate of socialism and for the prosperity and security of the Motherland."

The fact is that this too is creation, only of a special sort, albeit no less noble in essence--the creation of human souls. And so the veteran continues to have no end of work, as it was then in the years of his Komsomol youth.

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CSO: 1801/366

## ARMED FORCES

### EDITORIAL SUPPORTS INNOVATORS, USE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jun 84 p 1

[Editorial: "Technical Creativeness of Millions"]

[Text] Today an army of many millions of enthusiasts of technical progress celebrates its holiday--Inventor and Innovator's Day.

The Communist Party and Soviet state view the workers' technical creativeness as one of the most important forms of their participation in economic development and production management. Comprehensive support of invention and innovation in our country is an inalienable part of state policy directed toward creating every opportunity for a genuine blossoming of Soviet citizens' creative initiative. The detachment of many millions of people with inquisitive minds is responding to this concern with impressive achievements. The people are solving complicated problems of improving production and strengthening the socialist Motherland's economic and defense might with inexhaustible energy and enthusiasm.

Every year thousands of new machines, instruments and devices are developed in our country which increase labor productivity, save physical resources and improve the Soviet citizens' working conditions. The creative thinking of inventors and innovators is put into each such innovation.

It was emphasized at the 26th CPSU Congress and at subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums that one of the most important tasks of the present five-year plan is to take all sectors of the national economy to the outposts of science and technology. Accomplishment of this task is inconceivable without the active participation of inventors and innovators, who make a substantial contribution to the development of new technology. A new invention originates in our country every ten minutes on the average. One can judge the effectiveness of the invention movement from its results: last year alone more than four million inventions and innovative suggestions were adopted. The cumulative economic effect from their use reached seven billion rubles.

There are many representatives of our famed Armed Forces among the enthusiasts of technical progress. They make a substantial contribution toward improving the effectiveness of competition under the motto "Be on guard, in constant readiness to defend socialism's achievements!" There are many examples of a high return from the efforts of innovators in the Armed Forces. There are people in every military district, group of forces and in the fleets whose work, imaginative daring and persistence in reaching a goal serve as an example for comrades. They include Honored Inventor of BSSR Col V. Dolgov, Honored Rationalizer of the RSFSR Col V. Blazhchuk, Maj S. Tkachenko, Capt 3d Rank V. Milkin, WO [Michman] V. Timofeyev, and many, many others. High indicators have been achieved in technical creativeness in the Missile Forces, in the Pacific Fleet, in the Kiev and Carpathian military districts, in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and in a number of military educational institutions and central repair enterprises.

But the bold thinking of innovators does not always receive necessary support, not all progressive innovations quickly find a practical application, and there are known instances of red tape and formalism when it comes down to adopting valuable suggestions. Commanders, staffs, political entities, the party and Komsomol organizations, and invention commissions are called upon to show more interest and determination in a further upsurge of the invention and innovation movement and to support innovators constantly. It is above all a question of the need to strengthen supervision over the practical adoption of inventions and improvements and for placing stricter demands on those who are directly responsible for this.

Experience indicates that innovators and inventors achieve greatest success where their creativeness is directed toward solving specific technical problems involving an improvement in combat readiness, in the entire training process, or in the upkeep, servicing and repair of equipment and weapons. We have to strengthen the role of a planned basis in all phases of the "life cycle" of progressive technical ideas and perform a better study of innovators' experience and propagandize and apply it broadly: not just the experience of individuals but, of special importance, that of foremost collectives. It is important to include the Army and Navy youth more widely in technical creativeness, to persuasively reveal the social and economic importance of work by the creators of new equipment, and resolutely oppose sluggishness and inertia.

One of the important tasks is to perfect the means and organization of command and control. Experience confirms that innovators can make a substantial contribution to this matter. We must be more vigorous in continuing a search for solutions aimed at a fuller and more rational use of computer technology, at an increase in flexibility of control and precision in the work of staffs, and at assuring stable and effective communications. The innovators can make a more substantial contribution to developing means for mechanizing labor-intensive jobs, raising labor productivity and improving everyday administrative and medical services.

The party highly values a feeling for new things in the workers. Having such a feeling means seeing the prospects and finding the surest ways to solve problems which arise. The invention and innovation movement helps to instil a feeling for new things in millions of toilers, it contributes to the rapid growth in personnel qualifications, and it creatively enriches their daily labor. Perfecting the forms and methods of organizing technical creativeness in the Army and Navy and prompting collectives' creative energy toward constant action means strengthening and expanding the ranks of innovators.

A bold flight of thought, a profound interest in accelerating scientific-technical progress and strengthening the socialist homeland's defensive capability, high patriotism, and the feeling of being a proprietor of the country are what is typical of our inventors and rationalizers. Let their numbers multiply and let their contribution to fulfillment of the tasks of building communism grow.

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## ARMED FORCES

### MAJ GEN MOSKOVSKIY OBITUARY SIGNED BY YEPISHEV, OTHERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Jul 84 p 4

[Obituary: "V. P. Moskovskiy"]

[Text] Maj Gen (Ret) Vasiliy Petrovich Moskovskiy, a prominent political worker and Great Patriotic War participant, died at age 80 after a lengthy illness. He gave his entire life to serving the socialist Motherland and the work of the Communist Party, of which he was a member since 1928.

Moskovskiy was born in 1904 in the village of Bocheyno, Ulomskiy Rayon, Vologda Oblast. He began his working life as a 12-year-old lad. He was called up for military service in 1926. After completing the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin in 1939 he was the editor of the Kiev Special Military District newspaper KRASNAYA ARMIYA. During the Great Patriotic War he edited the Northwest Front newspaper ZA RODINU and the Air Forces newspaper and journal.

Moskovskiy held the post first of deputy editor and then chief editor of the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for almost ten postwar years and did much to improve its ideological and literary level.

During 1955-1971 Moskovskiy worked as first deputy chief of the Agitprop Department of the CPSU Central Committee Buro on the RSFSR, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary USSR Ambassador to the KNDR [Democratic People's Republic of Korea], and chief editor of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. He took an active part in sociopolitical life. Moskovskiy was elected a member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission, he twice was elected deputy to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and he was deputy chairman of the Soviet War Veterans' Committee.

Moskovskiy firmly implemented party policy and displayed high organizing abilities, principle, and a creative approach to accomplishing assigned tasks in all posts assigned him. He always was distinguished by modesty, a respectful attitude toward people and concern for their needs and requests.

The Communist Party and Soviet state highly esteemed Moskovskiy's services. He was awarded the Order of Lenin, two orders of Red Banner, the Order of Labor Red Banner, three orders of Red Star and many medals.

The memory of V. P. Moskovskiy, a fiery patriot of the Soviet Motherland and a staunch, courageous party member, will be preserved forever in our hearts.

M. V. Zimyanin, G. F. Sizov, K. M. Bogolyubov, B. I. Stukalin, S. L. Sokolov, A. A. Yepishev, M. S. Kapitsa, Ye. M. Chekharin, A. I. Sorokin, M. G. Sobolev, B. P. Utkin, A. S. Zheltov, N. I. Makeyev, and M. F. Nenashev.

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## ARMED FORCES

### EDITORIAL ASSESSES RESULTS, PROBLEMS OF SUMMER TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 84 p 1

[Editorial: "The Commander's Tactical Skill"]

[Text] The summer training period is a time of intensive exercises, flights, firing practice, missile launchings and ocean cruises. The practical work in the field, in the air and on the sea and ocean expanses is a strict and thorough going test of the combat readiness of units and ships, a demanding review of the personnel's training level and their ability to use the weapons and equipment effectively. The tactical and specialized tactical exercises are a serious test for commanders and staffs.

The demands made of the officer's tactical training are constantly increasing. This is due to the increased complexity of modern combat, the increase in technical equipment possessed by the troops and naval forces, the rapid development of military art, and the profound changes occurring in methods of performing combat missions. "We must learn to fight in a modern manner," Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of defense, emphasized at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations. "In order to do so we must have a good knowledge of the enemy, of his weapons and tactics, skillfully organize and conduct reconnaissance, in the first place. Secondly, we must constantly and flexibly combine in our combat powerful fire, the attack in depth and surprise maneuvers on land, in the water and in the air, and strive for close interaction among all men and equipment. Thirdly, we must firmly retain the reins of control of troops and weapons in a complex situation, in a situation of massive radio-electronic interference created by the enemy."

The army and navy have many commanders who have demonstrated themselves to be mature technicians and skillful organizers of combat. Tankmen of the battalion commanded by Guards Major M. Belyavev, for example, received an excellent rating in an exercise involving field fire. The commander directed the fighting of his own subunit and of attached and supporting subunits confidently and flexibly in the complex and dynamic situation. Antiaircraft gunners of the missile battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Voznyuk also consistently demonstrated excellent tactical training. The successes achieved by the outstanding officers and their subordinates are based on daily efforts to see that the exercises are of high quality and are conducted in a complex situation conforming to the demands of modern combat, a good mastery of the equipment and weapons, and a creative search for the best ways to employ them.

The improvement of tactical skill is a multifaceted process. It is inseparably linked with the officer's Marxist-Leninist preparation. The more thoroughly the commander masters the theory of Marxism-Leninism and scientific Marxist-Leninist methodology, the more thoroughly will he understand the general laws of warfare and the nature of combat, the more deliberately he performs his practical tasks and the more clearly he sees the prospects for the development of military affairs.

The commander's development as a tactician and as the organizer of combat operations is inconceivable without purposive independent work to perfect his practical skills and without thorough study of the experience of the Great Patriotic War and its creative use in the new situation. It is also inconceivable without the constant improvement of organized forms of training.

The path to tactical skill begins with a thorough study of field manuals. While providing the officer with the general principles for using the men and equipment, the manuals teach him how to delve into the specific features of the specific situation and to employ techniques and methods of combat not anticipated by the enemy.

It is important for every tactical and specialized tactical exercise to be conducted in a situation approaching combat reality as nearly as possible, for it to force the participants to perform at full capacity. Life demands that experimental actions be practiced in exercises. This opens up the broadest of possibilities for a creative search for the commander at any level.

The officer training must focus on the constant improvement of the officer's tactical skill. It is effective when the principle "The Chief Teaches the Subordinate" principle is observed. Short tactical drills, group exercises and all other forms of training are expected not merely to increase the officer's knowledge but also to actively promote good morale and fighting efficiency in them and teach them to operate in a complex situation, with a rigid time limitation. The new officers need special attention. Demandingness of them must be combined with support, assistance and comradely concern.

Unfortunately, the results of the winter training and the first progress checks in the summer training period indicate that the tactical training is not always properly organized. We have average and lagging units and ships along with the outstanding ones, which perform the combat training missions in an exemplary manner. The battalion commanded by Captain V. Kruchina, for example, performed poorly in a night battle. The subunit was late moving up to the line for going over to the attack. The officers did not get their bearings in the area well enough in the dark, controlled the fire poorly and committed other errors. In this and a number of other subunits and on certain ships gaps in the tactical training have resulted from simplifications in the organization of drills and exercises and from poor monitoring of the training process by senior chiefs.

The staffs have a great role in the training of officers. How well the officer training is planned, its orientation toward the accomplishment of the most important and priority tasks, the methodological level of each class and its material and technical support depend upon the staff. The staff officers, chiefs of branches of troops and the services, and flagship specialists are expected to actively help the commanders to summarize and publicize progressive

experience and to pioneer in the adoption of everything new and promising in the use of men and equipment on the battlefield. The staff is required to set an example of exacting, realistic assessment of what has been achieved and to seek reserves for improving the personnel's field, air and naval training and the professional skill of the commanders.

The tactical training of the officers is an object of constant concern for political organs, party and Komsomol organizations. It is their task to increase the personal responsibility of commanders-and-communists and Komsomol members for their tactical training.

To find ways of accelerating the shaping of the commander and to help each officer to master the tactics of modern combat to perfection is to further improve the combat readiness of the Armed Forces and the homeland's defense capability.

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## ARMED FORCES

### UNCOOPERATIVE RESPONSE TO PUBLIC CRITICISM HIT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Col V. Filatov: "The Concluding Word"]

[Text] I sat in the spacious classroom at a party meeting of communists in the air regiment. The speaker at the rostrum was the regimental commander. Now he would read from a written text, now raise his eyes to those in the audience and speak as though impromptu. The speech contained both criticism and praise--everything in moderation.

Following the speech there was the proper announcement: "Let us begin the discussion." The communists went to the rostrum one after another. They spoke about urgent matters, including the unsatisfactory training of some specialists--and they named names--about how the regimental staff is propagating a multitude of generally worded orders, which have now turned into a paperwork flood in which the real work is drowning--and they cited facts. The communists commented that the results of the socialist competition are not regularly summed up in the flights and squadrons, that apathy and boredom have reigned at Komsomol meetings recently. In short, the report was actively discussed, the talks were to the point and the suggestions were useful. Major of Medical Service V. Zolotarev chief of the regimental medical service, also took the floor. He stated that the airmen had recently visited the health center very little, that there was one in the regiment and that there was also a chart indicating when the airmen visited it. An inspection showed that the chart was a fabrication, however. The airmen were not visiting the health center because little thought was given to the makeup of the crews. The crew members received their regular leaves at different times, which created inconvenience, and the entire crews could neither visit the health center nor go on leave at the same time. All of this was producing fatigue in the flight personnel and in the final analysis, affecting the combat training. The doctor also commented that physical exercises were not being conducted in the regiment, that even volleyball had been abandoned....

I would mention oncemore that a great deal was said at the meeting to which the regimental commander, the staff communists and the political section should have paid heed and taken into account in their subsequent work, and with respect to certain talks--the one by Major of Medical Service V. Zolotarev, for example--they should have immediately taken the necessary steps. These were serious deficiencies, after all. The discussion ended, however, and the chairman of

the meeting turned the floor over to the speaker for the concluding word. Now the commander was at the rostrum again. He had barely crossed the threshold, so to speak, when he began sweeping aside the critical comments, refuting the whole business.

Zolotarev especially caught it. "You think about what you are saying.... You should stick to your medicine, and I'll take care of the other matters somehow...." The entire concluding word was in the spirit.

The commander and I left the meeting in the same vehicle. The chief of the regimental political section was with us. The commander turned to him and said: "What are our medics doing with the alcohol? Just send the people's inspectors there and I'll settle with the doctor. I'll teach him...." At the point I had to intervene, to talk about the meaning of the concluding word at the meeting and about his reaction to the criticism from the speaker's platform.

The editors frequently receive letters describing a similar situation, one in which certain speakers use the concluding word for the formal suppression of criticism. And this is absolutely inadmissible. Anything can happen in life. Some person may unjustifiably accuse or reproach the party organization, the entire team or individual comrades deliberately or otherwise. What we have here is a different matter, and the speaker did not have the right to remain silent. He had an obligation to respond, to correct the individual, if necessary, and prove that there was no basis for such talk.

It is proper for the speaker to take advantage of the concluding word, after conferring with the secretary of the party buro or the party committee or a member of the higher party organ, to provide some sort of summation of the discussion of the problem raised, if necessary, to draw certain conclusions or to direct attention once more to some certain matter.

If the discussion of the report has been vigorous, the subsequent talks to the point and the suggestions useful, the speaker ordinarily does not make a concluding talk.

Sometimes one finds a practice being followed at party meetings whereby the commander is always the last to speak in the discussion, and it turns out like that concluding word we discussed in the beginning. This does not promote the development of criticism and self-criticism.

Criticism is an extensive concept, but the suppression of criticism also comes in many forms. The CPSU Charter does not prohibit anyone from speaking first or last. In each specific case the commander is in the best position to determine when to take the floor. It is important never to forget ethics and tact, however.

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## ARMED FORCES

### BETTER ENFORCEMENT OF RULES, REGULATIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 84 p 4

[Article by Col Justice V. Belyavskiy, chairman of the Military Tribunal of the Red Banner Ural Military District: "Is the Aktiv Active?"]

[Text] Sergeant V. Romanyuk committed a gross violation of safety measures during the driving exercise. The regimental commander charged Major O. Ul'yanov, the investigating officer, with the task of looking into what had happened. It was learned that the violation of regulations was a result of more than merely a lack of personal discipline on the part of the sergeant. Certain subunit officers and warrant officers did not know the regulations and were therefore not demanding that their subordinates observe them. When the investigating officer checked the other subunits he found the same situation there. The commander took immediate steps on the basis of his report. All of the regimental officers and warrant officers were tested. Talks were conducted with the soldiers and sergeants. I would mention in passing that all of the regimental investigating officers took part in the talks. The personnel began to be briefed prior to each class and in other cases where this was required. The safety rules are observed most strictly in the regiment today.

Generally, this was just an ordinary occurrence. There are grounds for taking another look at it, however. In the first place, because not all of the commanders and political workers are yet skillfully relying upon the broad legal aktiv--upon those same investigating officers, for example--for the legal indoctrination of subordinates and for preventing infractions of the regulations. And secondly, because this work is frequently not begun until something far out of the ordinary, as they say, has occurred.

At one time the aforementioned regiment was not doing everything necessary in this area. The matter was essentially limited to the presentation of individual lectures or talks by members of the agitation and propaganda group and once in a while, by the military legal experts. While acknowledging this, the commander and his deputy for political affairs would only throw up their hands and say that they had a lot to do and could not get around to everything. But what about the regimental legal aktiv? The comrades would only shrug their shoulders.

Officially there was such an aktiv in this regiment as well. Each of the members was just pulling his own "load," however, and that without any special zeal.



The people's controllers were mainly interested in the state of the equipment. This is an important area, but it is clearly not their only area of work. Members of the comradely courts of honor of officers and warrant officers considered it sufficient to discuss the conduct only of those who came before the comradely court. Few of them would have recognized the people's assessors on the military tribunal. They could all have worked more productively, however. And there were things to work on.

How could the investigating officers and the people's assessors not have known about absolutely specific violations of safety rules for operating vehicles occurring at various times in various units, for example? The investigating officers and people's assessors were regularly familiarized with studies of those cases, of the factors and conditions making them possible, at the military judge advocate's office and the garrison military tribunal. Extremely valuable information, valuable for an understanding of the real significance of a specific written instruction on safety measures, was not known in the subunits with the members of the legal aktiv. Now our sergeant Romanyuk had become convinced from his own unpleasant experience, so to speak, that there can be no deviating from any legal instructions. Unfortunately, as it turned out, there was no one to point this out to him earlier.

For too long Warrant Officer V. Vandyskev's work at the food depot was not monitored at all. The people's controllers never looked into the situation, and the members of the internal inspection commission did nothing as they waited for time to conduct the next regular inspection. And the machinations at the depot had become the talk of almost the entire post.

In short, the regimental legal aktiv was like a cold machine: If something happened, it would start up, but the activists themselves would not perform with any kind of vigor. This was not due to lack of responsibility or inertia on their part, of course. It was mostly due to the fact that they were poorly supervised, that they were left in the shadow, as it were, of other activities in the regiment. A great deal was done to strengthen discipline and regulation order, after all, as we have already mentioned. Certain individuals could not conceive of anything else the members of the internal inspection commission, as an example, could do in the matter. It was felt they were conducting the inspections well, that this would be their contribution to the common task. Some people lost sight of the fact that it is not as important to conduct the inspection properly as it is to make certain that after the inspection it does not become necessary to make up losses, to reclaim deficiencies or even to instigate criminal proceedings. Just who, if not those people whose official or public position requires them to have a good knowledge of a certain area of legal relations and the corresponding documents, should work systematically and purposely to prevent infractions of the law, to promptly detect and eliminate things which could cause them?

It is nice to be able to say that the attitude toward the legal aktiv has changed in the regiment, that specific steps have been taken to strengthen the authority of the activists and make full use of their possibilities. Organizationally, this consisted of the establishment of a council for the legal aktiv, which is headed by Lieutenant Colonel N. Tarasov, a political

worker. The council membership includes the chairman of the internal inspection commissions, the people's control group and the comradely courts of honor of officers and warrant officers, and other comrades. I would not say that such a body is universally needed. It is not a matter of establishing one, of course, but of seeing to it that the regimental commander and his deputy for political affairs begin devoting far greater attention to the members of the legal aktiv and channel their efforts into the strengthening of legality and regulation order.

Those who violate discipline have begun rendering an account at the aktiv meetings, for example. Naturally, the commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations work with those guilty of infractions. Members of the legal aktiv have their own approach to the matter, however, their own arguments for the undeviating observance of laws and regulations.

I think that Senior Lieutenant S. has to be profoundly grateful to Captain V. Kazarin, a member of the comradely court of honor of junior officers for the latter's assistance in eliminately such defects of character as lack of self-discipline and sloppiness. At one time those very qualities caused the senior lieutenant to be late for work and resulted in reprimands for his unsatisfactory appearance. The demandingness of a colleague and authoritative member of the officer community came at just the right time.

It was Major G. Kapel'yan, a member of the legal aktiv, who was first to provide a correct legal assessment of Private M. Alimuratov's conduct. Toward the end of the latter's service term, he had begun yelling at his co-workers and generally attempting to stress his superiority over them. Even in appearance. Then he replaced the heels on his boots with "stylish" high heels. Are not such "trifles" not the beginning of what we call nonregulation relations among the servicemen, if they are not handled with proper demandingness? Major Kapel'yan informed the subunit commander and the secretary of the Komsomol organization of his opinions. The soldier's behavior received a friendly rebuff in the collective, and there was nothing for him to do but change his ways.

All the members of the regimental legal aktiv are now operating in accordance with a special plan, and this is producing pretty good results. The incidence of disciplinary infractions has dropped markedly--not due to their efforts alone, of course. There are also fewer deviations from the regulations in the work of officials. All of this is further conformation of the fact that there is always a turn for the better when a comprehensive approach is taken toward the indoctrination of the personnel and the strengthening of order, when all existing possibilities are used for this purpose. This includes the influence of the unit legal aktiv.

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## ARMED FORCES

### MONUMENTS ON KRONSHTADT NEED ATTENTION, REPAIR

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 84 p 4

[Article by Capt 3rd rank V. Kocherov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "In Debt to History--Followup on a Letter"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reader V. Yurov, resident of Cherepovets and veteran of the Great Patriotic War, wrote a letter to the editors. It dealt with the treatment of monuments to the past in Kronshadt.

"I saw them tear down the wall of a citadel passageway at Kronshtadt," V. Yurov wrote. What large granite blocks it was made of! All of the blocks were secured with metal brackets, and the grooves were filled with lead. It was built to last for centuries.

"We shall also preserve the Petrovskiy Dry Dock as a memorial for our descendants. This is a poem to labor. Part of the dock has been left to the mercy of fate, however. The whole thing is rusting.

"Trees have grown to a height of 5-meters at the Navy Arsenal. The Petrovskaya Wharf is becoming a ruin...."

I went to Kronshtadt. I visited the rayispolkom and met with those in charge of the garrison.

"If you have no objections," S. Zhamkoch'yan, officer, political worker and deputy to the local soviet, proposed, "Let's take a walk around the town after work. We can see for ourselves what Comrade Yurov was writing about."

We visited the Petrovskaya Wharf. It certainly does not look like a ruin. On the contrary, the wharf embellishes the sea front. We walked along the recently restored Fish Market and passed the renovated Menshikov Palace. Zhamkoch'yan also showed me the renovated iron latticework along the Obvodnyy Canal. One sensed that an effort was being made in the city to preserve historical and cultural monuments. Many new monuments have been erected to the fortress-city's revolutionary and combat past.

The first impression created by the author of the letter to the editors was that he could not see the forest for the trees, as they say. A more careful look at the situation, however, confirmed the fact that the Kronshtadt people do deserve some criticism, that they have not gotten around to everything and are in debt to history.

I had a talk with Captain 3rd Rank (Retired) Nikoay Ivanovich Baklagin, an old resident of Kronshtadt.

"We still have no memorial boards in memory of the Petergof Landing Operation or of writer Novikov-Priboy's visit here," he said. "To our shame, we do not know where Bellinsgauzen's grave is located. The Arsenal and Naval Assembly buildings are in bad shape."

I took Yurov's letter to Tamara Nikolayevna Lapina, secretary of the Kronshtadt division of the society for the preservation of historical and cultural monuments. She remembered the author of the letter. He had dropped in at the society division and talked with her when he was in Kronshtadt.

"I can't agree with everything Yurov wrote," Tamara Nikolayevna said. "A great deal has been done in the city to improve the preservation of historical monuments. Yurov is right, however, when he says that it is not safe to ignore such monuments as the Arsenal. Or take the Summer Park. The repair work was poorly done there, and much of the work has not been finished. Trees have grown up on certain sections of the fortress wall. The Petrovskiy Dock basin is becoming overgrown. "The condition of the former Naval Arsenal building is especially alarming. Its walls will stand for centuries yet, but the cornice is falling off and the roof has holes in it."

"We only rent the building," I was told at the Arsenal. "Those in charge of it, the Department of Marine Engineer Service, has to repair the roof. For 2 years we have been trying to get the Department of Marine Engineer Service to make the repairs, but we have not been successful."

The repair of the building of the former Naval Officer's Assembly (now a seamen's club) has also become a problem. Repair work was begun on it in 1978. It moved right along at first. Later it was performed sporadically and last year it came almost to a halt.

"Why has this happened?" I asked A. Kovalev, rayon architect for GIOP (State Inspectorate for the Preservation of Architectural Monuments).

"I feel that those in charge of the establishment have not demonstrated any initiative."

The chief of the seamen's club officially turned the building which formerly housed the Naval Officer's Assembly over to the construction workers. Guarded by no one, it was left to the mercy of fate. It is not surprising that there was a fire, which did great damage to the architectural monument. Those to blame have not been identified. And how can we measure the damage done to the indoctrination of the seamen by delaying the repair of the seamen's club. The library at the seamen's club has lost one-third of its readers in six years, because most of the books lie inaccessible in the basements. Furthermore, there is no place for a reading room. Nor does the former Naval Assembly, which now houses the club, have a proper setup for a choir, an ensemble or special groups to function.



When I asked Colonel G. Puninskiy, chief of the Department of Marine Engineer Service, what had caused the disruptions in the repair of the seamen's club, he told me that he did not have the authority to give the construction workers orders.

"Who does?"

"Colonel Simuni, deputy commander for construction and building of the Leningrad Naval Base."

I spent a fairly long time in Kronshtadt trying to find out who was to blame for the fact that the Arsenal roof was collapsing, that the Petrovskiy Dock basin and certain sections of the fortress wall had become overgrown with trees, and the repair work on the seamen's club had been dragged out. But... I did not find out. "The lack of 'guilt' of those who could with complete justification be considered to blame was supported by thick volumes of correspondence, reports and memoranda, which protected them more reliably than the fortress wall. Just who then is to protect the monuments?"

This is primarily the responsibility of those organizations whose accounts include the historically valuable buildings. Secondly, the preservation of the monuments is the direct responsibility of the initial State Inspectorate for the Preservation of Architectural Monuments. Finally, it is the soviet's responsibility.

How are those currently in charge of the architectural monuments, the organizations housed there, taking care of the monuments? In most cases they are taking care of them, but in some cases they are simply negligent, making problems out of simple things. Officer S. Zhamkoch'yan, for example, told me that it was impossible to remove trees from the Arsenal roof. After I left, however, I learned that they were removed.

With respect to the State Inspectorate for the Preservation of Architectural Monuments, meetings with its workers in Leningrad showed that the inspectorate is thoroughly aware of the situation of the Kronshtadt monuments and holds strictly accountable those guilty of neglecting their preservation. The State Inspectorate for the Preservation of Architectural Monuments is also supposed to see to it that the planned repairs are carried out on the architectural monuments, however. The inspectorate does not always consistently demand with respect to this, however.

And what about the Kronshtadt Rayispolkom? The Law of the USSR "On the Preservation and the Use of Historical and Cultural Monuments" states that state control over the preservation and the use of historical and cultural monuments is exercised by the soviet ispolkoms. F. Karmazinov, chairman of the Kronshtadt Rayispolkom, however, worries only about "his own" monuments and is not concerned about "other people's," that is, those on the accounts of other organizations.

We can preserve a great deal for our descendants if we want to and if we constantly remember that the loss of historical and cultural monuments is irreversible.



On the last day of my special assignment I met with Colonel M. Simuni in Leningrad. I asked him whether it would be possible to reinforce the roofs of the Arsenal and the Naval Assembly to save the buildings from further damage.

"I think so," Simuni answered. "I promise to send someone there tomorrow to look into the situation."

Enviably efficiency. If only it could always be that way.

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## ARMED FORCES

### INNOVATIONS NOT RECEIVING PRACTICAL APPLICATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Khrapovich, ship commander: "Blockage--How to Accelerate the Introduction of Useful Innovations"]

[Text] The new training year has crossed its equator. That which was achieved during the winter training period must be further developed and become the foundation from which to move on to new frontiers, to the performance of more difficult tasks. But their accomplishment will require improving job skills, taking fuller advantage of the tactical and technical features of the combat and technical equipment in the army and navy, and the safe and quality operation of the ship's complex facilities.

This was the subject of discussion at one of the meetings of officers and secretaries of primary party and Komsomol organizations held on the ship during a long cruise. It would have seemed that the mood of the meeting need not have been so very critical. The ship has been in first place in the squadron for the third year in a row and is not planning to relinquish its position. Almost all of the names on the board listing the best innovators are "ours." One of the first was Captain Lieutenant V. Zubko, secretary of the party buro, himself. He was followed by Captain Lieutenant K. Murzin, Captain 3rd Rank S. Andreyev.... Many other officers, warrant officers and seamen also have the spirit of innovation and take an active part in the technical creativity. And this is understandable. After all, the application of rationalization proposals and inventions makes it possible to operate the combat equipment at a better level, to conserve materiel and resources, and to better the norms. Furthermore, it provides an incentive for improving one's knowledge and perfecting one's combat skills.

The communists voiced many feelings of alarm in their talks, however. "Why is it easier," Captain 3rd Rank Yu. Bandrivskiy asked, "to invent something than to get the invention applied? The 'backlog' of unrealized rationalization proposals is growing by the year, but they are not being used with proper effectiveness. If we collected all the suggestions and developments provided by our collective alone over the past 3 years, for example, we could build a new ship with extremely good technical specifications." This was somewhat overstated, of course, but it is something to think about. And Communist V. Sobolev's statement that "the innovators on our ship have done a great deal, but those around us sometimes know nothing about our innovations" was a reproach directed at those responsible for technical creativity at higher headquarters.

I recalled my own "ordeals." They happened a long time ago, to be sure, but something can still be learned from them. I was second in command at the time. I brought the commander several sheets of paper outlining suggestions for improving the tactical procedures for employing the weapons and maneuvering the ship. How proud I was when the veteran commander told me the next day: "A lot of it is vague and you have not backed some of it up with sufficient figures, but at least two of your ideas are worth a serious trial...." And how disappointed I was later when I learned on shore that my "papers" had been filed away in a report and that was to be the end of it.

Why is it that the enormous creative energy and efforts of the efficiency experts are sometimes blocked at the stage of introduction? Why is it that we still have the paradoxical situation in which in one case everyone is interested in the application of innovations and in another, only the author of the invention or the rationalization proposal himself? Some people might not agree with this. They might say that officials named in the corresponding documents are charged with these matters. That is true, but their concern frequently does not go beyond the brief response: "The suggestion has been considered."

I would also like to mention another matter. The rationalization work is sometimes planned on the basis of proposal obligations "per person." And the wise rule which says "better less, but better" frequently sinks into oblivion. Once there is a plan, it must be fulfilled. Extremely simple improvements are sometimes elevated to the ranks of the exceptionally important, and the technical creativity itself is sometimes turned into a purely mechanical process. It is not surprising to me that the newsletters describing innovations are filled with what is obviously "trivia."

Why is it that precisely those inventions and improvements from which the greatest effect could be expected are frequently not taken on board? Why is it that in many cases, when the question of adopting innovations is decided, the emphasis is placed on having "as many as possible at the least possible cost"?

Much of the blame can be placed upon material and technical difficulties, of course. Everyone understands this. The blockage is also caused by purely organizational factors, however. Here is a specific example. Captain Lieutenant V. Zubko developed a unit for testing refrigerators. The innovation makes it possible to conserve significant amounts of labor and materials in the performance of labor-consuming operations and totally eliminates the injuries which occur when working by the old methods. Since the device could not be produced without some manufactured equipment and appropriate materials, however, Captain 3rd Rank N. Sharov, acting secretary of the inventions commission, stamped it "Not to be adopted, since it complicates the system." and pigeon-holed the application.

A year went by. The author of the invention and his colleagues succeeded in convincing the commission members of the unit's value and of the practical need for it. A new resolution was issued: "To be adopted. Issue author's certificate." But how much time will now be needed to complete the project? And who specifically will handle its introduction, if the author himself is unable to?

Those in charge of the inventions commission have numerous official duties, activities and concerns, reports and plans of their own, and are unable to actively perform the day-to-day work of introducing "complex" innovations. The existing statute does not require that they deal with the actual introduction of the inventions which are accepted. There is something to think about here.

It was stated at the 26th party congress and subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee that production should be vitally interested in seeing to it that the fruits of the thinking and of the labor of scientists and designers are put to use as rapidly as possible and in the best possible manner. This is not a simple task, of course. It requires the elimination of obsolete habits and indices. It is absolutely essential for the nation, for the people and for our future, however. This party statement was also meant for us fightingmen of the Armed Forces, who are handling today's modern, complex combat equipment.

The adoption of innovations is not a new subject. Its acuteness is not diminishing, however, you will agree. On the contrary, the number of unutilized, valuable developments of obvious benefit is not being reduced but is actually growing. What is causing this? Where does the blockage occur in the complex chain of the introduction process?

I suggest that we should resolutely reject the practice of planning the number of future innovations "per person" and not limit the matter to numbers, without studying or taking into account the benefit or the quality. Differentiation, and not gross numbers, is the important thing. One automatically arrives at the conclusion that those in charge of the inventions commissions should regularly render account to the authors of the improvements and inventions about the fate of their developments. We obviously need to increase the personal responsibility of those individuals upon whom the adoption of the most valuable rationalization proposals on the ships and in the units depends and have them present reports more frequently at higher headquarters and political organs. In short, we need to discuss matters with those in charge both publically and in private.

The cadre question is also very important. The selection and appointment of people to the inventions commissions should not be a formality. We need to seek skillful organizers patiently and persistently, seek people who are truly competent and active and are personally interested in improving all of the work. Army and navy innovators can make a far greater contribution to the accomplishment of combat training tasks if we eliminate many deficiencies in the organization of the technical creativity. This is in the interest of our cause.

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## ARMED FORCES

### ACCOUNTANT'S RECORD OF THEFT NEVER INVESTIGATED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Maj Justice N. Khomenok: "Inappropriate 'Tactfulness'—a Case From Legal Experience"]

[Text] The surprise audit revealed a large shortage in the cashier's office of the military enterprise. More than 6,000 rubles had been misappropriated by... the cashiers themselves, headed by deputy chief accountant L. Bobrovnik. How could it happen that people with sticky fingers were allowed to handle money? Was it just a matter of the human heart being a mystery?

No, the facts uncovered by the judge advocate's office brought out something else—the fact that Liliya Yakovlevna Bobrovnik was capable of "confusing" the state pocketbook with her own was certainly no closely guarded secret. A people's court had made this known for all to hear. And Liliya Yakovlevna was forbidden to hold positions involving responsibility for money. She did not like to bring up the past, however, and did not mention this when she went to work at the military enterprise. Unfortunately, no one at the enterprise took the time to thoroughly check out an individual who would be entrusted with items of great value. Even the fact that the candidate for the position of deputy chief accountant did not have a labor book did not disturb either the key personnel or officer E. Korpezin, chief of the enterprise. If the book was lost, that was that, they reasoned, with a tactfulness worthy of better application, and issued Liliya Yakovlevna a new one.

I would mention in passing that Bobrovnik had worked quite close to the military enterprise before taking the job there, in the same city. One telephone call would probably have been sufficient to learn about her performance there and about what had really become of her labor book. Finally, the administration was simply obligated to request from Bobrovnik's former job the information necessary for issuing her a duplicate of her labor book. Certain people apparently did not want to be branded as bureaucrats, however. It was as though they were establishing purely personal relations with the individual and not assigning her to an extremely responsible position.

Life provided yet another opportunity to correct the error. In a confidential talk with chief accountant N. Serzhan Liliya Yakovlevna admitted her former "sins" and told Serzhan about the conviction. Nina Zakharovna did not tell anyone about this, however, assuming that her present colleague had benefited from the lesson and become a totally different person. One can understand her hoping



for this. In proceeding as she did, however, Nina Zakharovna unlawfully assumed the function of a court, for only a court can alter its own decision.

Had an individual's natural tactfulness once again interfered with the performance of her official duties? No, the court called the behavior of officials at the enterprise simply irresponsible. Irresponsible, because personal relations must not be mixed with job relations, because one must not be "kind" and "accommodating" when this is contrary to the established rules. Tact in such a situation is nothing other than negligence.

It remains only to be added that a number of changes were recently made in our laws. Among other things, they now cover criminal liability both for those who conceal a conviction when taking a job and officials hiring individuals for positions which a court has forbidden them to hold. We can assume that this will help certain officials to clarify their position in such cases and to strictly observe the procedure established by law.

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## AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### USE OF MID-AIR RAMMING DURING WORLD WAR II

Y. BODINY in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 14 May 84) p 9

Article by Maj Gen Avn A. Zaytsev, professor, department chief at the Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Air Force Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin: "A Weapon of the South-armed"]

[Text] The fourth decade since the end of the Great Patriotic War is coming to a close.

All of our Soviet fightingmen, including our glorious airmen, set unsurpassed examples of courage, heroism, selfless bravery and great military valor while battling the enemies. More than 600 of them destroyed enemy aircraft with frontal attacks, by striking them with the propellor or the wing of their own combat machine after using up all their ammunition in the fierce air engagements.

Mid-Air Ramming: The Hitlerite Luftwaffe had never experienced this. Nor did this tactical combat procedure exist in the chronicles of the American and British air forces.

Our nation was the birthplace of mid-air ramming. Military pilot Petr Nikolayevich Nesterov, the father of aerobatics, rammed an enemy aircraft almost 70 years ago, in the fall of 1914. On 25 October 1937, while performing his international mission in the Republic of Spain, Lieutenant Ye. Stepanov, Soviet pilot and Komsomol member, destroyed a Savoy-Market-81 bomber while repelling a night raid on Barcelona by enemy aircraft. On 31 May 1938 Captain A. Gubenko rammed the lead aircraft of a Japanese group in the sky over China near Hankou.

Senior Lieutenant V. Skovarikhin, Captain V. Kustov and Lieutenant A. Moshin, communists, made ramming attacks over Khalkhin-Gol in the summer of 1939.

The mid-air ramming began to be used on a truly massive scale during the first part of the Great Patriotic War. Not covered by a single regulation except the "regulation" of love for the homeland and personal responsibility for its defense, it became a part of the aerial combat arsenal.

On the First Day of the Battle: Today we know of 15 pilots who carried out mid-air ramming on 22 June 1941. During the first half-hour of the enemy's attack on the USSR mid-air ramming was executed almost simultaneously by Senior Lieutenant I. Ivanov, flight commander from the 46th Fighter Regiment, and Junior Lieutenant D. Kokorev, a flight commander from the 124th Fighter Regiment. Between 0500 and 0600 enemy aircraft were rammed by Lieutenant A. Moklyak, deputy squadron commander from the 67th Fighter Regiment, Junior Lieutenant L. Butelin, a flight commander from the 12th Fighter Regiment, Lieutenant S. Gudimov, a deputy squadron commander from the 33rd Fighter Regiment and a still-unknown Soviet pilot flying a U-2 aircraft.

On the first day of the war Junkers were rammed by pilot V. Loboda of the 10th Fighter Regiment between 0600 and 0700; by Junior Lieutenant Ye. Panfilov, a flight commander from the 126th Fighter Regiment, at 0830; by Lieutenant P. Ryabtsev, a flight commander from the 123rd Fighter Regiment, around 1000; by Senior Political Instructor A. Danilov, a deputy squadron commander from the 127th Fighter Regiment, at 1000; by Lieutenant I. Kovtun, a pilot in the 62nd Fighter Regiment, at 1200; and in the afternoon by Junior Lieutenant I. Ignat'yev, a flight commander from the 728th Fighter Regiment, by Senior Lieutenant P. Kuz'min, a deputy squadron commander from the 127th Fighter Regiment... .

State awards were presented to many pilots then and there for their valor and courage. Pilots P. Kharitonov, S. Zdorovtsev, and M. Zhukov, who defended the approaches to Leningrad, were the first to be awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union for ramming attacks on enemy bombers.

The Ramming is Done... by a Bomber: It is usually believed that only a fighter pilot can perform a mid-air ramming. In the battles waged against the Hitlerites, however, there are dozens of examples of the crews of ground attack aircraft, long- and medium-range and dive bombers ramming the enemy.

In a skirmish with enemy aircraft during the second half of 22 June, for example, Lieutenant T. Maliyenko, a deputy squadron commander of the 86th Bomber Regiment, abruptly ended a Junker's flight by ramming it, and several hours before that Captain A. Protasov, a squadron commander from the 16th High-Speed Bomber Regiment, used the ramming technique on another sector of the front.

Mid-air ramming attacks were employed by Soviet pilots mainly during the most intense fighting on the Soviet-German front. A total of 33 enemy aircraft were destroyed in this manner on the approaches to Moscow, for example. Leningrad's defenders employed mid-air ramming 44 times. The record shows that 41 ramming attacks were carried out in the skies over Stalingrad, 13 of which were made in September of 1942, when the Hitlerites had aerial superiority on that axis.

The Second, the Crucial... : If the first strike did not succeed, the pilot would attack again, despite enemy machine-gun and cannon fire. On 3 October 1942, on the approaches to Stalingrad, Lieutenant V. Pyatov, Komsomol member and flight commander from the 211th Fighter Regiment, cut off the rudder and a fin of an enemy bomber by striking them with his propellor. When he saw that the Dornier was still flying, the pilot maneuvered into position and destroyed it with a second attack.

The following incident also occurred: Junior Lieutenant M. Rodionov, a flight commander from the 562nd Fighter Regiment and candidate member of the party, cut off a section of a Junker with the propeller of his aircraft at an altitude of 50 meters, at which it is impossible even to parachute to safety. The fascist reconnaissance plane dropped literally to the treetops, however, and was getting away. Rodionov struck its fuselage with his propeller. The enemy was destroyed....

**Ramming is an Act of Courage and Skill:** It essentially reflected not only the selfless patriotism of Soviet pilots, but also the skill--perhaps even the virtuosity--with which they performed the attacks. As a rule mid-air ramming attacks were only employed after all of the ammunition had been used.

Knocking the enemy out of the air and then rising into the sky once again to fight the fascists until they were totally destroyed--such was the self-asserting nature of the mid-air ramming. After beginning his fighting career on the Western Front and destroying an enemy bomber with a ramming attack in September of 1941, Senior Lieutenant N. Kozlov, Hero of the Soviet Union, cut off the tail unit of a J-88 at low altitude over the Volga in May of 1942. Kozlov ended the war in Berlin, after making 620 combat sorties and shooting down 23 aircraft. The names Amet-Khan Sultan, N.D. Gulayev, V.D. Lavrinenkov, S.D. Luganskiy and P.Ya. Golovachev are well known in our nation. These famous aces, twice awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union, shot down a total of more than 150 aircraft, and each of them had a mid-air ramming to his credit.

**The Enemy Bears Witness:** "We had only heard of mid-air ramming," Rudolf Luger, commander of a fascist bomber rammed by Junior Lieutenant Nikolay Grunin, stated during interrogation. "I am now convinced that it is an awesome thing."

Hitlerlites who succeeded in parachuting from rammed aircraft were forced to admit how far from the truth their Fuhrer was when he said that Soviet pilots understood nothing about aerial warfare, that this was a "purely German form of combat." One of them made the following statement when interrogated: "When the Soviet aircraft overtook the Junker and sliced into it, I thought that the sky had collapsed on me."

The pilots who employed mid-air ramming include aviators representing the most diverse nationalities of the great family of Soviet peoples: Russians and Ukrainians, Belorussians and Georgians, Armenians and Tatars, Kazakhs and Kirghiz.... Their feat demonstrated with new and convincing force the friendship and fraternity of all the peoples of our multinational nation and their infinite love for the homeland and for the Communist Party.

From the editors: The work of identifying cases of mid-air ramming attacks made by Soviet airmen during the Great Patriotic War and determining the number continues at the Air Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin. In subsequent issues of the magazine we shall briefly describe many ramming attacks in chronological order and provide biographical information on the airmen who performed those feats. Our readers can add to, clarify or provide new information on this matter by reporting it to the editors of KRYL'YA RODINY.

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## AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCES APPLICABLE TO CONTEMPORARY BATTLE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Maj N. Tsvetov, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "We Are Learning From the Experience at the Front"]

[Text] The "enemy" was solidly fortified on a dominant hill. Time after time the motorized riflemen had attempted to take the hill, in order to go over to a decisive offensive, but the "enemy" had beaten off all attacks. In that difficult situation it was decided to strike at the firing points of the defenders from the air, in order to eliminate the obstacle to the motorized riflemen's advance.

The responsible mission was assigned to the helicopter pilots commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Korotkov. More than once the holder of the orders of the Red Star and "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," 3rd degree, had had to make accurate strikes against ground targets in the most difficult situations, demonstrating his good combat skill, stamina and steadfastness.

After receiving the assignment, the veteran officer-and-aviator carefully studied all of the information on the situation which had developed. He learned that the "enemy" had foreseen the possibility of an air strike against its positions and had set up air defense weapons on the approaches to the hill. They were arranged in such a way that they created a solid curtain of fire, which could cost the helicopter pilots considerable losses, should they try to cross it. In addition, the airmen would have to fly to the target facing the sun. This would considerably reduce the airmen's horizontal visibility and was in the "enemy's" favor.

In order to succeed the airmen would have to come up with a plan which would reduce the "enemy's" tactical and fire superiority and make it possible to carry out an accurate, surprise attack. Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Korotkov recalled a story told him by his father, who fought at the front.

He told how the airmen had made effective use of a "luring" technique during the Great Patriotic War. A powerful group of fighters with a small number of ground attack planes would be sent out approximately an hour before the main flight, in order to assure the greatest possible degree of surprise for our ground attack



aircraft and bombers. The ground attack planes would simulate an attack on an airfield, while our fighters would engage the enemy fighters in battle, forcing them to use up their ammunition and fuel. When the main group of ground attack planes and bombers appeared over the target, the fascist fighters were unable to take off, not having had time to refuel and replenish their ammunition.

"Maybe we could use that technique," Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Korotkov suggested to the regimental commander. His plan consisted in having two groups attack ground targets. The first group, consisting of several helicopters with missiles, would reach the area of the attack before the second group. Anticipating an attack by rotary-wing aircraft, the "enemy" would concentrate its antiaircraft fire on them. The main group of helicopters, which would attempt to approach the target undetected, would take advantage of this.

The officer's suggestion was supported. The group of helicopters acting as the "lure" took off at the designated time. They approached the target area in a manner assuring that the "enemy" could detect them. This was done to give the other side the impression the airmen did not suspect that the positions of the defenders were reliably protected against air attack and were preparing to carry out a decisive attack against the firing points right from the line of flight.

Dots left the helicopters and headed for the ground. Clouds of smoke from airborne missiles rose up over the positions of the defenders. The "enemy's" air defense weapons immediately opened fire. Rounds from large-caliber machine guns leapt toward the rotary-wing aircraft, but the airmen maneuvered skilfully and took themselves out of range.

After a certain time they made another approach to the target. Once again the thunderbolts of missiles arched sharply toward the slope of the hill. And once again the "enemy" concentrated all its attention on the helicopters attacking its positions from the front. This is just what the airmen in the main group led by Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Korotkov were waiting for. Taking skilful advantage of the terrain relief, they suddenly approached the target from the direction of the sun at minimum permissible altitude. Having focused its air defense weapons in the other direction, the "enemy" was unable to prevent the airmen from making a powerful bombing attack. All the firing points of the defenders were destroyed on the first pass. This was the signal for the motorized riflemen, who entered the attack in unison and captured the hill.

After the fierce training battle had ended the motorized riflemen wholeheartedly thanked their friends, who had achieved a decisive victory over a powerful and well equipped "enemy." The airmen were thus helped in a difficult situation by the advice of a front-line soldier, who had told about a technique successfully employed by Soviet fightingmen in the struggle with the fascist invaders.

More and more time separates us from the past war. Few of the veterans are left in the combat ranks. Only in the museums can we see the equipment with which the valorous Soviet hawks smashed the enemy. The air fighters today are armed with improved aircraft systems, the capabilities of which far exceed the very best models of the war years. Because of this some airmen also feel that the tactical procedures used at the front can no longer be applied.

I was talking with a young pilot once. He has a reputation in his regiment as a well trained airman who perform skilfully in the most difficult situation of modern, dynamic aerial combat. He spoke with enthusiasm about the tactics of all-aspect (vserakursnyy) attacks and about the modern techniques for making the most effective strikes against ground targets. I only had to mention the use of the front-line experience, however, and he commented with surprise:

"That was another time entirely! How can you compare our equipment with that used in combat by the front-line fighters? This is why such demands are made of tactics."

Today's missile-carrier does embody the latest achievements of science and technology, of course. It is capable of successfully destroying a high-speed, maneuvering target from a great distance, day or night, executing attacks from complex maneuvers and making accurate strikes on small ground targets. But does all of this mean that the experience accumulated in the fierce battles with the enemy now exists only in museum exhibits?

We all know that when we make a certain decision in our daily life, we ordinarily rely upon the knowledge we possess, that which is in the "storehouse" of our past experience, so to speak. We only have to select a more or less similar occurrence or process and make it the basis for our subsequent action.

Similar principles are in effect in the combat training practices. I know from my own considerable flight experience that there are no situations in which the airman assigned a specific mission begins at once to invent and implement an original method for executing it, one never before tried by anyone. A version or a method which has already been worked out and has demonstrated its viability is ordinarily taken as the basis in such situations. And the more of these there are in the airman's "storehouse," the easier it is for him to select one closest to the situation under consideration, and the more rapidly and easily it can be applied in the specific situation. What could be more valuable than the front-line experience in this respect? Born in rigorous battle and paid for in blood, it is a treasure of inestimable value. And this not true just in matters of the moral-psychological conditioning and the indoctrination of the fightingmen in a spirit of courage, steadfastness, infinite loyalty to their duty and a readiness to sacrifice themselves for the sake of victory over the enemy. Front-line experiences are also that "storehouse" in which the thinking air fighter truly interested in perfecting his combat skills can find the most effective tactical procedures, shrewd maneuvers and methods for combatting the enemy in various situations.

Are the techniques for making strikes against targets protected by air defense weapons, as a example, obsolete? There were many methods of combatting air defenses in the past war. Can we reject them today? Of course not. They should be improved and developed, however. This means that there is real meaning in the study of those techniques employed by the front-line pilots.

During an attack, for example, they would sometimes make a sharp turn and attack from the direction where they were least expected. And the maneuvering ordinarily involved course and altitude. Is this not an example for today's airmen assigned similar missions?

We know that the fascists were frightened by their losses of aircraft and rapidly modified the Me-109. The power of their engine was increased, which made it possible to increase their speed. In addition to that, extra weapons and armor were installed on the aircraft. It appeared that the Hitlerites had achieved their goal--their aircraft were superior with respect to horizontal flight, armament and protection for their main assemblies. It turned out just the opposite, however. Their losses did not drop, but actually increased. What happened?

Simply this. The Soviet pilots made a careful study of the enemy's strong and weak points. They learned that with the increase in weight the maneuverability of the fascist aircraft had deteriorated. With this in mind, our airmen attempted to maneuver vertically in their attacks and to approach the target from the rear half of the circle. The more highly maneuverable Soviet fighters began to impose their combat tactics upon the enemy. This example, I feel, convincingly demonstrates the fact that it is extremely important in the contemporary situation to have a good knowledge of the combat capabilities of the enemy's equipment.

No, the experience of the front-line fighters is an extra weapon for us. It should be thoroughly studied in the interest of further improving the combat training of the airmen. But what is the best way to do this? In my opinion, there are many unutilized reserves in this area. Take the meetings with the front-line fighters, for example. There is no denying that these take place in a jubilant, exciting and cordial atmosphere. Is it always possible for those attending the meetings to talk with the front-line fighters and learn something about their specific combat experiences, however? There is usually just a meeting in the auditorium at the officers' club, where those present only see the front-line fighter behind the presidium table.

Experience has shown, however, that an earnest and instructive talk with a front-line fighter is not only of benefit with respect to the moral indoctrination of the fightingmen, but that it also helps them acquire additional, valuable combat know-how which can be used in the daily combat training. Colonel (Retired) V. Semenov, for example, visited unit "X" and told the airmen in detail about an incident in which a pilot made a forced landing in an aircraft damaged in a battle. The other airmen covered their comrade from the air until he received help.

Some time later, during a tactical flight exercise, Guards Major Yu. Semenchenko, one of those present at the meeting with the front-line fighter, found himself in a difficult situation. According to a hypothetical problem, the combat aircraft he was flying was "shot down" and made a forced landing. The helicopters then formed into a circle and reliably covered the site where their comrade had landed against "enemy" attack. And so, many years later, a technique born in the flames of battle came in handy to the airmen for the successful accomplishment of their assigned mission.

Modern aerial combat is complex. Good skill, self-control and persistence are essential for achieving victory--and not last on the list is the experience of the front-line fighters.

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## NAVAL FORCES

### ADM KAPITANETS ON NAVY DAY

[Editorial Report] Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 29 July 1984 publishes on page 1 a 1900-word article by Commander of the Baltic Fleet Admiral I. Kapitanets in honor of Navy Day entitled "Reliable Guard of the Motherland." Commenting on the contributions of Latvian servicemen and the role of the Soviet Navy in general he notes that "nuclear submarines equipped with modern navigational and control means and armed with awesome missiles form the basis of its military might."

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## MILITARY HISTORY

### ARMY GEN IVANOVSKIY REVIEWS OPERATION 'BAGRATION'

Minsk KOMMUNIST BELORUSSII in Russian No 5, May 84 pp 34-42

[Article by Army Gen Ye. Ivanovskiy, commander of Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "Operation 'Baration'--On the 40th Anniversary of Belorussia's Liberation From the German Fascist Invaders"]

[Text] The offensive by Soviet forces in Belorussia began 40 years ago in the summer of 1944. It was the glorious event which greatly predetermined the success of all subsequent operations on the Soviet-German front and which had a significant affect upon the future course of World War II.

The Belorussian Operation was preceded by outstanding victories by the Soviet Armed Forces. The defeat of German fascist forces at Kursk and the Red Army's successful offensive in the fall of 1943 and the spring of 1944 greatly altered the situation on the central axis. The Hitlerite Wehrmacht's plans for creating a strategic defense on the "Eastern Rampart" collapsed. The capture of the "Smolensk Gate," a vast region between the Western Dvina and the Dnepr, created a serious threat to the left flank of the Zentrum Army Group, and when our forces broke through to Poles'ye it broke up the solid strategic front of the fascist forces, which seriously complicated interaction between the Zentrum and Sud army groups.

The fall of 1943 had found Belorussia still totally occupied by the enemy. Its people languished under the Hitlerite yoke. More than 2 million Soviet people died at the hands of the Nazis, and hundreds of thousands were driven off to Germany to perform hard labor. The entire republic was covered by a network of concentration camps and prisons. Hitlerites had turned most of its cities into ruins and burned thousands of towns and villages, and around three million residents were left homeless. The Hitlerite fascists did not succeed in breaking the Belorussian people's will to combat the hated occupiers, however.

The beginning of Belorussia's liberation involved combat operations by the Kalinin Front on the Vitebsk axis, an offensive by forces of the Western Front on the Orsha and Mogilev axes and by forces of the Central Front on the Gomel axis. In recognition of this the Kalinin Front was renamed the first Baltic Front, the Central Front was renamed the Belorussian Front, and the Western Front was renamed the 3rd Belorussian Front on 20 October 1943 (the Belorussian Front became the 1st Belorussian Front on 17 February 1944).



Troops of the Central Front were the first to enter the republic. Units of the 65th Army commanded by General P.I. Batov forced the Snov river and captured the village of Gorodok in Gomel Oblast on 25 September 1943. This was the first community in Belorussia to be liberated from the German fascist invaders. On 26 September the Soviet Information Bureau announced the liberation of the city of Khotimsk, the republic's rayon center.

The offensive on the Gomel axis was begun on 15 October. After forcing the Dnepr near Loyev, forces of the 65th Army captured a bridgehead after 5 days of fierce fighting, which played a significant role in the development of the offensive after that. Forces of the 48th, 65th and 61st armies carried out the main strike there for purposes of enveloping the grouping of fascist forces near Gomel and Rechitsa from the southwest and cutting it off from the other forces of the fascist 2nd Army which was operating between the Berezina and Pripyat'. An offensive by forces of the 11th and 63rd armies was simultaneously under way north of Gomel. Our troops cut off the Gomel-Kalinkovichi Railway with a swift attack on the enemy's rear area and captured Rechitsa on 17 November. That same day the 65th Army liberated the city of Vasilevichi and reached the Berezina near the village of Gorval.

Despite the danger of being encircled, the Hitlerite 2nd Army's command decided to hold Gomel at any cost. The enemy brought up a large quantity of tanks and artillery. Following fierce fighting our units entered the city on 28 November, however. The Soviet soldiers saw a terrible scene of destruction. The Hitlerites had blown up all of the city's best buildings before withdrawing.

The fighting to liberate Belorussia's eastern regions continued in the winter of 1944. Kalinkovichi, Mozyr and hundreds of other communities were liberated in January.

As the enemy retreated, it offered increasingly fierce resistance. Troops of the 65th Army captured the strongpoint of Ozarichi in a skillful maneuver on 20 January. North of there our scouts discovered three death camps set up by the Hitlerites, where thousands of peaceful citizens languished, including children, women and old people. It contained no housing at all. The people were living under trees, right on the snow, dying from starvation, from the cold and from typhus. Our soldiers saved 33,480 Soviet citizens at those camps, who had been doomed to inevitable death. Food stations, bath houses and field hospitals were set up for them.

The vile crimes of the fascists in the area of Ozarichi were discussed at the Nurnberg Trials on the main German war crimes. Those crimes demonstrated what imperialist forces are capable of. Peace-loving men must exercise vigilance with respect to the intrigues of today's seekers of world domination.

The other armies of the Belorussian Front were also advancing successfully. In the extremely difficult circumstances General A.V. Gorbatov's third Army took Rogachev on 24 February and captured a bridgehead on the western bank of the river near Zhlobin. And so, a number of areas in Belorussia were liberated during the fall and winter offensive, and good conditions were created for a devastating attack on the fascist Zentrum Army Group in the summer of 1944. Our units which had been advancing on the central sector of the Soviet-German front switched to a defense on 15 April 1944 on orders from Headquarters, Supreme High Command (VGK).

By inflicting the decisive defeat upon the fascist army, Soviet Armed Forces had altered the course of the war in their favor. They had convincingly demonstrated to the entire world that fascist Germany's defeat was inevitable, that the Soviet people were capable by themselves not only of driving the enemy out of their homeland, but also of liberating Europe's occupied nations from fascism. This forced ruling circles of the USA and England to open a second front in Europe. The operations of the American-British forces did not divert Wehrmacht forces from the Soviet-German front. By July of 1944 there were 228 divisions on that front, which was two-thirds of all fascist Germany's battle-ready divisions.

By the beginning of the Belorussian Offensive Operation the front line, which was more than 1,100 kilometers long, ran east of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Zhlobin and then along the Pripyat to Kovel, forming an enormous salient arched deeply to the east--the so-called "Belorussian Balcony," which had an important place in the operational and strategic plans of both sides.

The German fascist command set itself the mission of holding on to those repaired defense lines at any cost. From there they could make an attack on Moscow and create a threat to our nation's higher central industrial region. With the loss of Belorussia the Hitlerites were deprived of an important food and raw materials base, while the way was open to East Prussia, Pomerania and Poland for the Soviet forces. It was also of great political importance for the Nazis to hold Belorussia. It created the illusion in the population of Germany and its satellites that the fascist Reich had made "solid conquests" on the eastern front.

The Hitlerites had taken advantage of the suitable terrain features and created a powerful and deeply echeloned defense up to 270 kilometers in depth, which they called "Faterland" (Fatherland). The fascist command planned to defend those positions "as though the borders of Germany itself" and kept one of its largest groupings there. Together with adjoining formations of the neighboring Nord and Nord-Ukraine army groups, its effective combat strength included 63 divisions, three infantry brigades, more than 40 separate regiments and more than 10 tank and assault-gun battalions.

Hitler and his generals understood of course that the Soviet forces were preparing for new and victorious engagements, but they were confident that their defense was strong. It was not surprising that German military observer M. Gallensleben would state on 23 June, that is, on the first day of the offensive by our forces in Belorussia: "The Soviet offensive will run into a well arranged line of German strongpoints which extends from Narva past Chudskoye Lake through Vitebsk, Mogilev, and Rogachev...." The newspaper BERLINER BERSENZEITUNG was also impressing this on the Germans the same day: "Fighting of the past three years has thoroughly weakened the Soviet Army. This is why it is possible for the German army to repel the Bolshevik threat in the east...."

Considering the military-political situation, the Soviet Supreme High Command planned to route the enemy's strategic groupings during the second half of 1944 and complete the nation's liberation from the fascist invaders.

It was decided to make the main thrust in Belorussia. Considering the distribution of the enemy's divisions on the main axes on the Soviet-German front, headquarters concluded that the Hitlerite command was expecting the main combat operations to develop not in Belorussia, but on the southern wing of the front-- in Romania and to the south of the Pripyat on the Lvov axis. This conclusion was subsequently confirmed by documents captured from the enemy and by statements from prisoners.

Four fronts were enlisted for carrying out the missions in the initial Belorussian operation; the 1st Baltic Front commanded by General I.Kh. Bagramyan, the 3rd Belorussian Front commanded by General I.D. Chernyakhovskiy, the 2nd Belorussian Front commanded by General G.V. Zakharov and the 1st Belorussian Front commanded by General K.K. Rokossovskiy. The Dnepr Military River Flotilla, long-range aircraft and air defense forces took part in the operation. Belorussian partisan forces interacted closely with the army units. The operations of the fronts were coordinated by representatives from headquarters: Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, deputy supreme commander, and Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevskiy, chief of General Staff. The air force combat operations were coordinated by Chief Marshal of Aviation A.A. Novikov and Marshal of Aviation F.Ya. Falaleyev.

The plan for the Belorussian Offensive Operation was approved on 30 May 1944 by the Supreme High Command and was code-named "Bagration." In accordance with this plan Headquarters carried out a number of important measures to prepare for the operation, reinforced the fronts with troops and combat equipment, and implemented a large group of operational camouflage measures and steps to mislead the enemy. They justified themselves entirely. The enemy's forces were carefully and thoroughly reconnoitered, and its plans and intentions were revealed.

The difficult and important missions facing the troops demanded good morale and fighting efficiency of the personnel. Party-political work in the units focused on this. It was conducted with the slogan of completing the homeland's total liberation from the fascist occupiers. Its specific substance consisted in explaining to the fighting men their patriotic duty to liberate Belorussia and the soldiers' tasks in the forthcoming operation, and indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of fraternal friendship of peoples of the USSR and our army's glorious combat traditions and of fierce hatred for the enemy. By that time the four fronts had around 15,500 primary party organizations with 621,000 communists, which was more than 26 percent of all the personnel. More than 40,000 fighting men joined the ranks of the Lenin party in June of 1944 alone.

The Belorussian Communist Party performed an enormous amount of political and organizational work among the local population and the partisans. By that time there were 150 partisan brigades and 49 separate detachments with a total strength of over 143,000 partisans operating within the republic. Headquarters, Supreme High Command, was counting on a combination of strikes by the Red Army and combat operations by the partisans in the enemy's rear area. The partisans were assigned the mission of disorganizing the enemy's operational rear services, preventing it from bringing in reserves to the front line and frustrating operational troop transfers.



On the night of 19 June 1944, in accordance with instructions from the Center, the Belorussian partisans attacked the radio communications of the Zentrum Army Group from the front line to the state border. Radio transport was disrupted and the main telegraph and telephone lines were broken as a result. Naturally, this affected the enemy's troop control during the crucial days of the Soviet offensive.

Operations "Bagration" was begun on 23 June and lasted until 29 August. It covered an enormous territory--more than a 1,000 kilometers along the front and up to 600 kilometers in depth--from the Dnepr to the Vistula and Narew. The offensive by Soviet forces in Belorussia took the enemy by surprise. This is borne out by statements made by a number of fascist military leaders. General Tippelskirch, commander of the German fourth Army, subsequently stated that "Model, who was in command of the front in Galicia, could not accept the possibility of a Russian offensive anywhere except on his sector." The Wehrmacht command fully agreed with him.

During the period from 23 June to 4 July our forces broke through the enemy's defense, defeated its flank groupings and created the conditions necessary for continuing the offensive. Five Hitlerite divisions were encircled near Vitebsk on the third day of the operation. Losing all hope of breaking out, they laid down their weapons on 27 June. The first significant breach had been made in the enemy's defense.

The ring of encirclement was closed around the enemy's Bobruysk grouping, which consisted of six divisions, on 25 June. The Hitlerite's defeat at Bobruysk created yet another breach in their defense. This permitted mobile troops of the third and first Belorussian fronts to advance rapidly toward Minsk.

During the period from 23 to 28 June the Zentrum Army Group was faced with the danger of a catastrophe. Its defense was penetrated on three axes of the 520-kilometer front and it suffered heavy losses. Soviet forces advanced 80-150 kilometers to the west and circled and destroyed 13 enemy divisions. "The German defeat in Belorussia," the British TIMES wrote at that time, "is becoming a real catastrophe. The fall of Mogilev and the defeat suffered by the Germans at Bobruysk are irrefutable proof of the total collapse of the German defense system on the upper Dnepr, a system which was extremely powerful."

The Soviet soldiers interacted closely with the partisans to defeat the German fascist grouping. The Belorussian Headquarters of Partisan Movement implemented a general plan of combat operations in the interest of the entire operation. The partisan formations performed specific missions of disorganizing the functioning of the enemy's rear services, destroyed enemy personnel, combat equipment and materiel, obtained intelligence and directed Soviet aircraft to important targets.

The Hitlerite command attempted to correct the situation of its forces in Belorussia with reserves and maneuvers from other sectors of the eastern and western fronts, hastily beginning the transfer of 46 divisions and four brigades to that area. These steps were too late, however, and could no longer effectively influence the course of events.

By the end of 28 June the 1st Baltic Front was engaged in combat operations on the approaches to Polotsk. Troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front had reached the Verezhina river. Troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were pressing the enemy from the east, and formations of the 1st Belorussian Front were outflanking the enemy from the south. Exceptionally good conditions had been created for encircling the main forces of the Zentrum Army Group east of Minsk. The mission of closing the ring was assigned to the third and first Belorussian fronts, which were to advance rapidly toward Molodechno and Baranovichi in order to create a mobile outer perimeter of envelopment and prevent the enemy from bringing up reserves.

General P.A. Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army broke up the enemy's resistance and liberated Borisov on 1 July. Units of the 2nd Guards Tatsino Tank Corps executed a rapid 60-kilometer move through the partisan region near Smolevichi and reached the approaches to Minsk. The enemy was routed in a night battle, and tanks swept into the city on the morning of 3 July. Soldiers of the 1st Guards Tank Corps and 3rd Army units entered the city from the south. By the end of the day the Belorussian capital had been cleared of fascists.

The third of July, when the Red Banner was raised over Minsk, went down in history as Soviet Belorussia's liberation day. That event evoked tremendous joy in all the Soviet people. And they were not alone. "The taking of Minsk," the DAILY MAIL stated, "is one of the greatest triumphs of the war. The British people share the joy of their Russian ally and congratulate it. The Russian feat is amazing."

While the fighting was under way around Minsk, troops of General N.S. Oslikovskiy's mechanised calvary group advanced 120-kilometers on the right wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front, liberated Vileyka and cut off the Minsk-Vilnius Railway. The mechanised calvary group commanded by I.A. Boliyev cut off the Minsk-Baranovichi Railway on the left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front and captured Stolbtsy and Gorodeya.

During the pursuit east of Minsk Soviet forces completed the encirclement of a 105,000-man enemy grouping 250-kilometers from the forward edge. This was a demonstration of the improvement in Soviet military art. The commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front appealed to encircled forces to surrender and guaranteed everyone who layed down his weapon that his life would be spared, that he would be fed and that the wounded and ill would receive medical aid. The appeal was rejected, however, and the fierce combat operation, which reached the point of hand-to-hand fighting, continued nonstop, day and night, until 11 July. The Hitlerite generals would not abandon their hope of escaping the encirclement. They wanted to wedge through the Soviet defense, whatever the losses. They encountered stiff resistance everywhere, however. A group of forces attempting to force its way through to Dzerzhinsk on the southwestern axis was defeated on 6 July and other groups had been smashed by 11 July. A total of 70,000 enemy soldiers were killed, and 35,000 were captured, including 12 generals.

The main forces of the four fronts continued to develop the offensive. Employing bold and determined, even daring, wide envelopment and out-flanking maneuvers and breakthroughs, our forces rapidly freed the republic's cities and towns of



occupiers. Aslanov's Guards tank brigade employed a skillful maneuver in the storming of Smorgon, an important enemy strongpoint. Lieutenant Shuydin and Junior Lieutenant Danilov secretly skirted the city from the north taking dirt roads and not the highway, and reached the western bank of the Viliya. A company of submachine-gunners and antitank-gun crews followed them across the river in the night. The next morning Captain Borisov's battalion began forcing the Viliya under the cover of tanks and an assault group. A fierce battle broke out. It became especially intense toward 1200 hours, when tankmen of Rodionov's battalion, operating south of the city, made a powerful attack on the enemy garrison. They cut off the fascists' withdrawal route from Smorgon to Vilnius, and by 0400 hours on 5 July the Hitlerites had been driven from the city.

Our forces liberated Molodechno that same day, Baranovichi on the eighth, Lida and Novogrudok on the ninth, Slonim on the tenth, Pinsk and Volkovysk on the fourteenth, and Grodno on the 16th. Our forces entered Soviet Lithuania on 14 July and liberated Vilnius, its capital.

Brest was liberated on 28 July, and all of the fascist invaders had been driven from Belorussian territory. Russians and Ukrainians, Kazakhs and Uzbeks, Georgians and Armenians--the sons of many peoples of the USSR--fought to liberate Belorussia. The results of the liberation attested to the good morale and fighting efficiency of the Soviet troops. The military art of the Red Army command and the mass heroism and infinite courage of the soldiers, sergeants and officers were brilliantly demonstrated in that operation, just as they were in previous engagements.

The homeland greatly appreciated the mass heroism demonstrated by fighting men of the Red Army in the fighting to liberate Belorussia. The title Hero of the Soviet Union was conferred upon more than 1,500 generals, officers and soldiers, and more than 402,000 fighting men were awarded orders and medals in July and August of 1944. More than 600 military formations and units were given honorary names.

The first strategic objective of the war--the liberation of Soviet territory from the fascist invaders--had been achieved when our forces reached the western borders of the USSR. While the Belorussian Operation was still underway our forces set about the next objective of the war--to help liberate the peoples of Europe from the Hitlerite yolk. Formations of the 1st Belorussian Front forced the Western Bug and entered Poland on 20 July. On 31 July they were already fighting on the immediate approaches to the suburbs of Warsaw and Prague. During the first part of August bridgeheads were captured on the western bank of the Vistula south of Warsaw in the areas of Magnusew and Pulawy. Forces of the third and second Belorussian Fronts reached the borders of East Prussia at the end of the month. That situation forced the enemy to remove additional forces from the western front and transfer them to the eastern front. This created a good situation for the operations of Anglo-American forces in Normandy, permitting them to fully develop their retarded success.

The Belorussian Operation was completed when the Red Army reached East Prussia and the Vistula. It resulted in the total defeat of the German Zentrum Army

Group and the total liberation of Belorussia, most of Lithuania, part of Latvia and a significant area of Polish territory east of the Vistula. Of the 97 Hitlerite divisions and 13 brigades fighting our forces, 17 divisions and three brigades were totally destroyed and 15 divisions lost more than half of their strength. The adjacent Nord-Ukraine and Nord army groups also suffered heavy losses.

The Belorussian Operation increased the Red Army's offensive strength and enriched Soviet military art with experience in organizing and executing a breakthrough of a prepared enemy defense, pursuing, encircling and destroying large enemy groupings in the tactical and operational depth. This experience was used in subsequent operations of the Great Patriotic War.

Recalling that extremely large strategic operations by the Soviet Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovskiy, one of the active participants in the operation, wrote the following: "The Belorussian Operation carried out by the Soviet Army in 1944 was distinguished from other operations by its enormous scale. During the operation our forces repeatedly encircled and successfully smashed large enemy groupings and captured large quantities of booty and many prisoners. The bourgeois falsifiers of the history of World War II, the overly zealous militaristic groups across the ocean and the revanchists from Western Europe should firmly remember the results of the engagement in Belorussia, as well as many other combat operations carried out by the glorious Red Army in the struggle with the Hitlerites." Uttered 20-years ago, these words are still valid and important today.

Our allies in the anti-Hitlerite coalition rated the battles fought in the Belorussian Operation highly. U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt wrote the following to I.V. Stalin, head of the Soviet government: "The swiftness of the offensives carried out by your armies is amazing...." British Prime Minister Winston Churchill also commented on the enormous importance of the battle fought in Belorussia in his memoirs: "There was little basis for doubting that the overall collapse would soon ensue." Even the military historians who falsified events on the Soviet-German front and downplayed the importance of the Red Army's victories were forced to acknowledge the catastrophe experienced by the Hitlerite forces in the summer of 1944. "...The defeat of the Zentrum Army Group," wrote Hitlerite General Butlar, "put an end to organized resistance by the Germans in the East." And the war log of the German high command stated that the defeat of that group was a greater catastrophe than the defeat at Stalingrad.

The successes achieved by our forces in the Belorussian Operation were an enormous victory of all the Soviet people. With their heroic labor in the rear the Soviet people produced everything necessary for our valorous Red Army to defeat the enemy--tanks, aircraft, guns, machine guns, submachine guns, ammunition and food. Our glorious Lenin Communist Party, which united all the people, the entire nation, into a single military camp, inspired and organized the victory. The battles fought for Belorussia, like the entire Great Patriotic War, demonstrated the great advantages of the socialist system over the capitalist system, the indestructible strength of the Soviet state, the

Soviet people's selfless love for their homeland and their loyalty to the principles of communism, the great strength of our friendship of peoples, and their awareness of their international duty to the workers of all nations.

All of these factors assured success in subsequent operations by the Soviet Armed Forces and the victorious conclusion of the Great Patriotic War as a whole. The same factors provided for the extremely rapid elimination of the effects of the war and the German fascist occupation and permitted the Soviet people, under party leadership, to reach great heights in the development of their economy and culture, in the building of a new world.

In Belorussia, as in other republics and oblasts which had been occupied, work was begun to restore the devastated cities and the towns as the territory was liberated from the enemy, while the Red Army was engaged in offensive operations and sweeping toward Berlin. The restoration of the economy was carried out on a new and higher technological basis. Modern industrial giants were erected and new branches of industry came into being in the republic. Minsk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Polotsk, Rogachev and other cities and towns in the republic rose out of the ruins and ashes. New socialist cities appeared on the map of Belorussia--Soligorsk, Novopolotsk, Zhodino, Beloozersk and Novolukoml.

A republic with a multibranch industry, Belorussia now produces high-performance tractors and powerful motor vehicles, modern electronic calculators and specially high-precision machine tools. The oil refining and chemical industries and electric power engineering are being successfully being developed in the republic. The agriculture sector of the economy is steadily improving. The republic's products are sent to all areas of the Soviet Nation and are well known in more than 100 of the world's states.

Cooperating closely with the peoples of all the fraternal Soviet republics, Belorussia's workers are now successfully implementing decisions coming out of the 26th CPSU Congress and assignments for the 11th Five-Year Plan, and are helping to improve all aspects of life in the developed socialist society with their work and creativity.

Fighting men of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District are closely linked with the republic's workers, kolkhoz workers and intelligentsia by close and strong ties of friendship. This friendship developed and grew strong in that the joint struggle and labor and has been tempered in the crucible of socialist and communist creativity. Party and soviet workers, representatives of labor collectives, scientists, writers and artists are frequent guests of the district's soldiers and officers. Today, on the threshold of the 40th anniversary of Belorussia's liberation, their meetings are devoted to the heroic events of those awesome war years and are helping to indoctrinate our people in the glorious combat and labor traditions of the party and the people.

Socialist competition has been launched on an extensive basis in the forces of the Red Banner Belorussian District, as it has throughout the Armed Forces. Its slogan--"Be on the Alert and Be in a State of Constant Readiness to Defend the Conquests of Socialism"--has met with a fervent response in the hearts of district fighting men. The field and air, tactical fire and special training

is being improved by the day. The experience gained in the Belorussian Operation of 1944 is extensively utilized in the training. Despite the fact that fundamental changes have occurred in weaponry in the 40-years since that operation, its experience and that of many other operations of Great Patriotic War has not lost its importance. Our use of the combat experience from the past war and its creative application in the troop and staff training practices are helping to expand the tactical and operational thinking of the officers and are helping us to accomplish today's tasks more thoroughly and better.

Determined and persistent training is presently underway in units of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District. The training tasks set for the forces for the summer training period demand great effort in the military work. This is also necessitated by the temporary international situation, the complexity of which was pointed out again at the April 1984 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. It has been greatly aggravated through the fault of imperialism. Pursuing its militaristic, adventuristic course, the U.S. administration has launched an arms race of unprecedented scale and set out on a path of crude interference in the internal affairs of other states and open aggression against a number of nations.

Fightingmen of the Red Banner Belorussian District are greeting the 40th anniversary of Belorussia's liberation closely united as never before round the Lenin Central Committee of the CPSU. True to the glorious combat traditions and loyal to their international duty, they, like our entire army, are prepared at all times to carry out an order to defend the state interests of the Soviet Union and the fraternal nations of the socialist commonwealth.

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## FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

### DISPLAY OF CONTAINER WEAPONS AT FRENCH EXHIBITION

Moscow KRYL'YA RODINY in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 14 May 84) p 31-32

[Report by Candidate of Technical Sciences S. Yeger, Paris-Moscow: "Through the Eyes of a Witness--An Engineer's Comments From the World Aviation Exhibition"]

[Text] 6. Aircraft Armament

Weapons for planes and helicopters were present throughout the exhibition. Numerous models were on display on planes and helicopters on the ground and were suspended in clusters from aircraft which flew over the airfield during the exhibition. Weapons for destroying people, structures and equipment from the air, those already in production and future ones under development, were advertised with full-scale specimens and mockups, with display stands and colorful pamphlets, with garish drawings and plain diagrams. The appeal was clear even without words: "Buy them and use them. The more people killed, the more dollars, francs and marks will go to the safes of the military-industrial countries."

The abundance and the diversity of types and varieties of plane and helicopter weapons on display at the 35th Salon attested the fact that a number of Western nations have joined in the arms race instigated by U.S. imperialism. It would be impossible to describe everything I saw in a magazine article. I shall therefore acquaint the readers with only one main trend, which has become clearly defined in recent years in the development of weapons designed to be employed from the air--canister and pod ammunition.

Such weapons systems are being developed extremely vigorously, especially in the USA and nations allied with it. The experts underscored their great combat effectiveness. The magazine AIR FORCE has calculated it would take only one tenth the sorties to perform a certain mission in a typical army operation using canister weapons, and only 3000 tons of payload instead of 33000 tons of conventional bombs. And their effectiveness will be even greater with the next generation of canister and pod weapons, which will employ homing sub-ammunition (mainly heat-seeking). The magazine estimates that 50-100 sorties and only 500 tons of payload will be adequate for performing a similar mission in an army operation. In general, some foreign experts and correspondents equate canister weapons to nuclear weapons on the basis of the extent of their complete destruction of ground equipment, including light tanks.



So-called "one-time" bomb canisters, which eject a mass of nonseparating contact elements, were adopted by the air forces of a number of nations several years ago. The Israeli air bandits repeatedly used weapons of this type in Lebanon. They were supplied by American companies. The B.L.-775 one-time canister system used on Tornado aircraft of the British air force. A canister contains a large number of contact elements with a shaped-charged warhead and a braking device, which increases the area of destruction, including the destruction of armored equipment.

The high level of combat effectiveness achieved in existing canister weapons no longer satisfies the leaders of the war departments of Western nations, however. Under pressure from them, ever-increasing scientific and design capabilities are being enlisted and the latest scientific and technological achievements are being used for the development of increasingly powerful weapons for airplanes and helicopters. The exhibits at the 35th Salon indicated that the main efforts are being focused on improving the canisters and pods themselves and on enhancing the effectiveness of their "filling"--sub-ammunition which separates two or three times after leaving the aircraft in order to increase the area of destruction. The West German company MBB, for example, exhibited an enormous ventrally suspended pod, the MW-1 Schtrobo, for the Tornado and Phantom aircraft. It is 5500 X 1500 X 700 mm and weighs 4600 kilograms when filled. Sub-ammunition is shot off through launching tubes in both directions perpendicular to the direction of flight, covering a broad strip beneath the aircraft. Two types of mines have been developed for this pod, and three types of contact sub-ammunition: concrete-piercing--for damaging runways and highways, shaped-charged--for destroying armored equipment, and fragmentation--for destroying personnel. The ammunition weighs from 0.5 kilograms (KB 44) to 12.5 kilograms (Stabo). The pod holds more than 4700 KB-44 contact elements.

The Americans advertised their TMD Scattering Pod for tactical sub-ammunition at the exhibit. It is loaded with sub-canisters containing Skeet ammunition or remote-action bombs. The ammunition is scattered in three stages to achieve the broadest possible damage to the area and objects located therein. The first scatterer, which has obliquely arranged aerodynamic surfaces, is activated after the pod separates from the aircraft. As it accelerates it ejects four sub-canisters. They have stabilizers, which open out in flight to give them stability. After the sub-canisters assume a vertical position, a time-dependent mechanism activates their individual parachutes. The parachutes are disconnected at the prescribed altitude, and braking rocket-engines engage. They give the sub-canisters a vertical speed of around 17 m/s and a rotation of 56 rpm. The Skeet sub-ammunition is then ejected by springs from the canisters in pairs separated by several milliseconds. Each Skeet is outfitted with a special device giving it an oscillating motion during its flight in a sloping ballistic trajectory ("a foot" extending out to the side). This makes it possible for the stationary array of the Skeet's infrared detector to scan an area of 0.4 hectare beneath the flight trajectory. The sub-ammunition's detector array contains several sensitive elements and a logic circuit for identifying targets from the heat they emit. After isolating the target--a tank, for example--the sub-ammunition's warhead is activated at a height of 10 meters over it.

The Skeet sub-ammunition with a hull 95 mm long and weighing 2.7 kilograms, is essentially a plate of heavy metal (copper, depleted uranium and tantalum), behind which a shaped explosive charge is located. After it detonates the

plate is compressed to form a rod with an initial flight speed of 2700 m/s and kinetic energy ten times greater than that of a 30mm shell from an aircraft cannon. It is estimated that such a percussion core is capable of destroying even a heavy tank from above.

If the Skeet does not detect the assigned target, its warhead explodes a moment before it touches earth and destroys enemy personnel. The sub-ammunition in the Skeet performs target search and "selection" at altitudes of 10 to 50 meters.

The TMD canisters can also be outfitted with special mines. Scattered over a broad area, the mines determine a tank's direction of movement by means of sound sensors, turn on their axis and fire one of two units of Skeet sub-ammunition so that its trajectory takes it over the tank. The moment it flies over the target it detonates and the tank is destroyed by the percussion core from above.

The development of a system for homing on the target in the small sub-ammunition, which supports the flight of the destructive element--a percussion core with a very high speed---is one example of the persistent efforts being made by weapons designers to microminiaturize the guidance apparatus and the weapon itself without reducing its effectiveness.

Judging from the displays at the 35th Salon it is planned to employ canister and pod weapons not only from airplanes and helicopters, but also from airborne, land- and ship-based cruise missiles. The LAD pod with sub-ammunition, which is dropped from an aircraft is undergoing testing in the USA. In the French pavillion there were posters depicting pods weighing from 400 to 1200 kilograms, which are being developed for such weapons. The FRG's displays included four versions of a planned CSW canister with sub-ammunition, including one with an inertial guidance system and a microengine.

Exhibits at the 35th World Aerospace Exhibition in France, particularly the canister and pod weapons, attested to the fact that imperialist groups of the West, headed by the USA, had begun a new round in the so-called "conventional" arms race. Progressive forces in the world are stepping up their struggle against this dangerous line.

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